Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain

In game theory, ‘extortionate’ tactics in two-player games are predicted to give way to ‘generous’ strategies. Here, the authors show in a human experimental sample that extortion can prevail as a strategy in games in which there is a specific reward for doing better than the other player.

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Lutz Becks, Manfred Milinski
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2019
Materias:	Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/283ad2e48d7249f7a3f6c5a8c06a51ce
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:283ad2e48d7249f7a3f6c5a8c06a51ce
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:283ad2e48d7249f7a3f6c5a8c06a51ce2021-12-02T14:35:55ZExtortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain10.1038/s41467-019-08671-72041-1723https://doaj.org/article/283ad2e48d7249f7a3f6c5a8c06a51ce2019-02-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-08671-7https://doaj.org/toc/2041-1723In game theory, ‘extortionate’ tactics in two-player games are predicted to give way to ‘generous’ strategies. Here, the authors show in a human experimental sample that extortion can prevail as a strategy in games in which there is a specific reward for doing better than the other player.Lutz BecksManfred MilinskiNature PortfolioarticleScienceQENNature Communications, Vol 10, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2019)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Science Q
spellingShingle	Science Q Lutz Becks Manfred Milinski Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
description	In game theory, ‘extortionate’ tactics in two-player games are predicted to give way to ‘generous’ strategies. Here, the authors show in a human experimental sample that extortion can prevail as a strategy in games in which there is a specific reward for doing better than the other player.
format	article
author	Lutz Becks Manfred Milinski
author_facet	Lutz Becks Manfred Milinski
author_sort	Lutz Becks
title	Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
title_short	Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
title_full	Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
title_fullStr	Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
title_full_unstemmed	Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
title_sort	extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2019
url	https://doaj.org/article/283ad2e48d7249f7a3f6c5a8c06a51ce
work_keys_str_mv	AT lutzbecks extortionstrategiesresistdiscipliningwhenhighercompetitivenessisrewardedwithextragain AT manfredmilinski extortionstrategiesresistdiscipliningwhenhighercompetitivenessisrewardedwithextragain
_version_	1718390997865463808

Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain

Ejemplares similares