Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain

In game theory, ‘extortionate’ tactics in two-player games are predicted to give way to ‘generous’ strategies. Here, the authors show in a human experimental sample that extortion can prevail as a strategy in games in which there is a specific reward for doing better than the other player.

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Lutz Becks, Manfred Milinski
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2019
Materias:
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/283ad2e48d7249f7a3f6c5a8c06a51ce
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