Extortion strategies resist disciplining when higher competitiveness is rewarded with extra gain
In game theory, ‘extortionate’ tactics in two-player games are predicted to give way to ‘generous’ strategies. Here, the authors show in a human experimental sample that extortion can prevail as a strategy in games in which there is a specific reward for doing better than the other player.
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Auteurs principaux: | , |
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Format: | article |
Langue: | EN |
Publié: |
Nature Portfolio
2019
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Accès en ligne: | https://doaj.org/article/283ad2e48d7249f7a3f6c5a8c06a51ce |
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