Evolutionary games on isothermal graphs
The spatial structure of a population is often critical for the evolution of cooperation. Here, Allen and colleagues show that when spatial structure is represented by an isothermal graph, the effective number of neighbors per individual determines whether or not cooperation can evolve.
Guardado en:
Autores principales: | Benjamin Allen, Gabor Lippner, Martin A. Nowak |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2019
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/2ca08bac60224d7a85f230a590c555ad |
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