Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology

In this paper, I first want to provide an argument (actually, a two-step argument) in favor of the claim that, qua primitive form of phenomenology, cognitive phenomenology is not only irreducible to, but also independent of, sensory phenomenology. Second, I want to claim that the two cognitive phen...

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Autor principal:	Alberto Voltolini
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	cognitive phenomenology having thoughts grasping thoughts independence Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/2cb7715a18b14f4ebfc0d832328f926e
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:2cb7715a18b14f4ebfc0d832328f926e
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:2cb7715a18b14f4ebfc0d832328f926e2021-12-02T10:38:58ZVarieties of Cognitive Phenomenology10.13128/Phe_Mi-200942280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/2cb7715a18b14f4ebfc0d832328f926e2017-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7231https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In this paper, I first want to provide an argument (actually, a two-step argument) in favor of the claim that, qua primitive form of phenomenology, cognitive phenomenology is not only irreducible to, but also independent of, sensory phenomenology. Second, I want to claim that the two cognitive phenomenologies that the previous argument has respectively shown to be independent of and merely irreducible to sensory phenomenology, namely the phenomenology of having thoughts and that of understanding thoughts, also instantiate different general kinds of cognitive phenomenology, i.e., a merely proprietary phenomenology and a both proprietary and distinctive phenomenology respectively. Third, I gesture towards a generalization of this distinction: any independent cognitive phenomenology is merely proprietary, any irreducible cognitive phenomenology is both proprietary and distinctive. In order to do so, finally, I have to dismantle Pitt’s (2004) argument to the effect that all cognitive phenomenology is not only both proprietary and distinctive, but also individuative. Alberto VoltoliniRosenberg & Sellierarticlecognitive phenomenologyhaving thoughtsgrasping thoughtsindependenceAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 10 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	cognitive phenomenology having thoughts grasping thoughts independence Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	cognitive phenomenology having thoughts grasping thoughts independence Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Alberto Voltolini Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology
description	In this paper, I first want to provide an argument (actually, a two-step argument) in favor of the claim that, qua primitive form of phenomenology, cognitive phenomenology is not only irreducible to, but also independent of, sensory phenomenology. Second, I want to claim that the two cognitive phenomenologies that the previous argument has respectively shown to be independent of and merely irreducible to sensory phenomenology, namely the phenomenology of having thoughts and that of understanding thoughts, also instantiate different general kinds of cognitive phenomenology, i.e., a merely proprietary phenomenology and a both proprietary and distinctive phenomenology respectively. Third, I gesture towards a generalization of this distinction: any independent cognitive phenomenology is merely proprietary, any irreducible cognitive phenomenology is both proprietary and distinctive. In order to do so, finally, I have to dismantle Pitt’s (2004) argument to the effect that all cognitive phenomenology is not only both proprietary and distinctive, but also individuative.
format	article
author	Alberto Voltolini
author_facet	Alberto Voltolini
author_sort	Alberto Voltolini
title	Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology
title_short	Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology
title_full	Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology
title_fullStr	Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology
title_full_unstemmed	Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology
title_sort	varieties of cognitive phenomenology
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/2cb7715a18b14f4ebfc0d832328f926e
work_keys_str_mv	AT albertovoltolini varietiesofcognitivephenomenology
_version_	1718396869898403840

Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology

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