Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition

Business organizations all around the globe are looking to expand circular models into their supply chains to harness economic and environmental benefits. Moreover, the act of giving incentives to retailers by the manufacturer is also quite prevalent in the present business environment. These incent...

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Autores principales: Deepak Singhal, Sarat Kumar Jena, Satyabrata Aich, Sushanta Tripathy, Hee-Cheol Kim
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: MDPI AG 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/2eeda60641f6432bb2317f5edcec2712
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:2eeda60641f6432bb2317f5edcec27122021-11-11T19:32:30ZRemanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition10.3390/su1321118392071-1050https://doaj.org/article/2eeda60641f6432bb2317f5edcec27122021-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/21/11839https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050Business organizations all around the globe are looking to expand circular models into their supply chains to harness economic and environmental benefits. Moreover, the act of giving incentives to retailers by the manufacturer is also quite prevalent in the present business environment. These incentives are offered to promote the sales of products of a manufacturer. Therefore, this paper examines the optimal decisions for a dual-retailer closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in which the manufacturer bestows the credit period to the one retailer (a firm that possesses shallow market penetration and has a higher insistence on the usage of the capital venture), and cash discount to the next retailer (a firm that occupies the market to a greater extent and receives lower thrust on the usage of invested capital) under a non-coordinated system and coordinated systems. This study proposes the mathematical model to determine the optimal decisions of the manufacturer in terms of credit period and cash discount and also compute the optimal decisions of the retailers for their retail prices and order quantities to maximize individual’s profit in the CLSC. Moreover, numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis is performed to get insights into the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and retailers. The results of sensitivity analysis show that credit period and cash discount increases with the rise in price elasticity, and decreases with an increase in cross-price elasticity. The findings also confirm that members of dual-retailer CLSC under coordination and manufacture’s incentive scenario generate higher environmental and economic benefits required to attain sustainability in production and consumption.Deepak SinghalSarat Kumar JenaSatyabrata AichSushanta TripathyHee-Cheol KimMDPI AGarticleclosed-loop supply chain (CLSC)supply chain coordinationincentivecredit periodcash discountremanufacturingEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 11839, p 11839 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC)
supply chain coordination
incentive
credit period
cash discount
remanufacturing
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
spellingShingle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC)
supply chain coordination
incentive
credit period
cash discount
remanufacturing
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
Deepak Singhal
Sarat Kumar Jena
Satyabrata Aich
Sushanta Tripathy
Hee-Cheol Kim
Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition
description Business organizations all around the globe are looking to expand circular models into their supply chains to harness economic and environmental benefits. Moreover, the act of giving incentives to retailers by the manufacturer is also quite prevalent in the present business environment. These incentives are offered to promote the sales of products of a manufacturer. Therefore, this paper examines the optimal decisions for a dual-retailer closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) in which the manufacturer bestows the credit period to the one retailer (a firm that possesses shallow market penetration and has a higher insistence on the usage of the capital venture), and cash discount to the next retailer (a firm that occupies the market to a greater extent and receives lower thrust on the usage of invested capital) under a non-coordinated system and coordinated systems. This study proposes the mathematical model to determine the optimal decisions of the manufacturer in terms of credit period and cash discount and also compute the optimal decisions of the retailers for their retail prices and order quantities to maximize individual’s profit in the CLSC. Moreover, numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis is performed to get insights into the optimal decisions of the manufacturer and retailers. The results of sensitivity analysis show that credit period and cash discount increases with the rise in price elasticity, and decreases with an increase in cross-price elasticity. The findings also confirm that members of dual-retailer CLSC under coordination and manufacture’s incentive scenario generate higher environmental and economic benefits required to attain sustainability in production and consumption.
format article
author Deepak Singhal
Sarat Kumar Jena
Satyabrata Aich
Sushanta Tripathy
Hee-Cheol Kim
author_facet Deepak Singhal
Sarat Kumar Jena
Satyabrata Aich
Sushanta Tripathy
Hee-Cheol Kim
author_sort Deepak Singhal
title Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition
title_short Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition
title_full Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition
title_fullStr Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition
title_full_unstemmed Remanufacturing for Circular Economy: Understanding the Impact of Manufacturer’s Incentive under Price Competition
title_sort remanufacturing for circular economy: understanding the impact of manufacturer’s incentive under price competition
publisher MDPI AG
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/2eeda60641f6432bb2317f5edcec2712
work_keys_str_mv AT deepaksinghal remanufacturingforcirculareconomyunderstandingtheimpactofmanufacturersincentiveunderpricecompetition
AT saratkumarjena remanufacturingforcirculareconomyunderstandingtheimpactofmanufacturersincentiveunderpricecompetition
AT satyabrataaich remanufacturingforcirculareconomyunderstandingtheimpactofmanufacturersincentiveunderpricecompetition
AT sushantatripathy remanufacturingforcirculareconomyunderstandingtheimpactofmanufacturersincentiveunderpricecompetition
AT heecheolkim remanufacturingforcirculareconomyunderstandingtheimpactofmanufacturersincentiveunderpricecompetition
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