Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment

Abstract Despite intensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, there have been few investigations into locality effects in interaction games, adaptation, and punishment. Here we analyze locality effects using an agent-based model of a regular graph. Our simulation...

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Autores principales:	Isamu Okada, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Eizo Akiyama, Fujio Toriumi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/2efa01902ff04c45a84600e5401ca3eb
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:2efa01902ff04c45a84600e5401ca3eb2021-12-02T14:37:39ZCooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment10.1038/s41598-021-86668-32045-2322https://doaj.org/article/2efa01902ff04c45a84600e5401ca3eb2021-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-86668-3https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Despite intensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, there have been few investigations into locality effects in interaction games, adaptation, and punishment. Here we analyze locality effects using an agent-based model of a regular graph. Our simulation shows that a situation containing a local game, local punishment, and global adaptation leads to the most robustly cooperative regime. Further, we show an interesting feature in local punishment. Previous studies showed that a local game and global adaptation are likely to generate cooperation. However, they did not consider punishment. We show that if local punishment is introduced in spatial public goods games, a situation satisfying either local game or local adaptation is likely to generate cooperation. We thus propose two principles. One is if interactions in games can be restricted locally, it is likely to generate cooperation independent of the interaction situations on punishment and adaptation. The other is if the games must be played globally, a cooperative regime requires both local punishment and local adaptation.Isamu OkadaHitoshi YamamotoEizo AkiyamaFujio ToriumiNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-7 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Isamu Okada Hitoshi Yamamoto Eizo Akiyama Fujio Toriumi Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
description	Abstract Despite intensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, there have been few investigations into locality effects in interaction games, adaptation, and punishment. Here we analyze locality effects using an agent-based model of a regular graph. Our simulation shows that a situation containing a local game, local punishment, and global adaptation leads to the most robustly cooperative regime. Further, we show an interesting feature in local punishment. Previous studies showed that a local game and global adaptation are likely to generate cooperation. However, they did not consider punishment. We show that if local punishment is introduced in spatial public goods games, a situation satisfying either local game or local adaptation is likely to generate cooperation. We thus propose two principles. One is if interactions in games can be restricted locally, it is likely to generate cooperation independent of the interaction situations on punishment and adaptation. The other is if the games must be played globally, a cooperative regime requires both local punishment and local adaptation.
format	article
author	Isamu Okada Hitoshi Yamamoto Eizo Akiyama Fujio Toriumi
author_facet	Isamu Okada Hitoshi Yamamoto Eizo Akiyama Fujio Toriumi
author_sort	Isamu Okada
title	Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
title_short	Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
title_full	Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
title_fullStr	Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
title_full_unstemmed	Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
title_sort	cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/2efa01902ff04c45a84600e5401ca3eb
work_keys_str_mv	AT isamuokada cooperationinspatialpublicgoodgamesdependsonthelocalityeffectsofgameadaptationandpunishment AT hitoshiyamamoto cooperationinspatialpublicgoodgamesdependsonthelocalityeffectsofgameadaptationandpunishment AT eizoakiyama cooperationinspatialpublicgoodgamesdependsonthelocalityeffectsofgameadaptationandpunishment AT fujiotoriumi cooperationinspatialpublicgoodgamesdependsonthelocalityeffectsofgameadaptationandpunishment
_version_	1718390998800793600

Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment

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