Cooperation in spatial public good games depends on the locality effects of game, adaptation, and punishment
Abstract Despite intensive studies on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games, there have been few investigations into locality effects in interaction games, adaptation, and punishment. Here we analyze locality effects using an agent-based model of a regular graph. Our simulation...
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Autores principales: | Isamu Okada, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Eizo Akiyama, Fujio Toriumi |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN |
Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2021
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/2efa01902ff04c45a84600e5401ca3eb |
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