Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT

Seventy-six years after the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world continues to face challenges to the existing arms control framework, part of the broader problem of the stagnation of multilateralism. There is a desperate need to reinvent the architecture of nuclear disarmamen...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Mao Sato
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Group 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/3001376ec53b4111b111ed9f4d3ea817
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
id oai:doaj.org-article:3001376ec53b4111b111ed9f4d3ea817
record_format dspace
spelling oai:doaj.org-article:3001376ec53b4111b111ed9f4d3ea8172021-11-04T15:51:57ZAdvancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT2575-165410.1080/25751654.2021.1993643https://doaj.org/article/3001376ec53b4111b111ed9f4d3ea8172021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2021.1993643https://doaj.org/toc/2575-1654Seventy-six years after the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world continues to face challenges to the existing arms control framework, part of the broader problem of the stagnation of multilateralism. There is a desperate need to reinvent the architecture of nuclear disarmament. While it seems almost impossible for the political deadlock to be broken with regard to entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the power of science continues to create a unique avenue for confidence-building measures (CBMs) to meet the needs of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. This paper re-examines the value of science as a tool for arms control verification by separating the issue of the CTBT’s non-entry into force from the immediate application of its verification regime. The progress of nuclear-test-ban monitoring can be measured against scientific indicators, irrespective of the status of the remaining Annex II countries. The CTBT has already practically satisfied its core function of monitoring nuclear testing with the existing structure. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has been progressing as an agent of CBMs, the development of civilian and scientific applications of the verification regime, and a capacity-building effort to attract more states to join the cause, and by doing so, sustaining nuclear-test-ban moratoriums.Mao SatoTaylor & Francis Grouparticlecomprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (ctbt)confidence-building measures (cbm)verification regimescience and technologycapacity buildingsustainabilityNuclear engineering. Atomic powerTK9001-9401International relationsJZ2-6530ENJournal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol 0, Iss 0, Pp 1-17 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (ctbt)
confidence-building measures (cbm)
verification regime
science and technology
capacity building
sustainability
Nuclear engineering. Atomic power
TK9001-9401
International relations
JZ2-6530
spellingShingle comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty (ctbt)
confidence-building measures (cbm)
verification regime
science and technology
capacity building
sustainability
Nuclear engineering. Atomic power
TK9001-9401
International relations
JZ2-6530
Mao Sato
Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT
description Seventy-six years after the atomic bombs exploded over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the world continues to face challenges to the existing arms control framework, part of the broader problem of the stagnation of multilateralism. There is a desperate need to reinvent the architecture of nuclear disarmament. While it seems almost impossible for the political deadlock to be broken with regard to entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the power of science continues to create a unique avenue for confidence-building measures (CBMs) to meet the needs of both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states. This paper re-examines the value of science as a tool for arms control verification by separating the issue of the CTBT’s non-entry into force from the immediate application of its verification regime. The progress of nuclear-test-ban monitoring can be measured against scientific indicators, irrespective of the status of the remaining Annex II countries. The CTBT has already practically satisfied its core function of monitoring nuclear testing with the existing structure. The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization has been progressing as an agent of CBMs, the development of civilian and scientific applications of the verification regime, and a capacity-building effort to attract more states to join the cause, and by doing so, sustaining nuclear-test-ban moratoriums.
format article
author Mao Sato
author_facet Mao Sato
author_sort Mao Sato
title Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT
title_short Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT
title_full Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT
title_fullStr Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT
title_full_unstemmed Advancing Nuclear Test Verification without Entry into Force of the CTBT
title_sort advancing nuclear test verification without entry into force of the ctbt
publisher Taylor & Francis Group
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/3001376ec53b4111b111ed9f4d3ea817
work_keys_str_mv AT maosato advancingnucleartestverificationwithoutentryintoforceofthectbt
_version_ 1718444638715510784