The constitutional right to freedom of scientific creativity: content, restrictions, regulation problems
Background. The right to freedom of scientific creativity is provided for by international acts on human rights, as well as constitutions of many countries of the world. At the same time, the emerging close dependence of mankind on technological progress is increasingly actualizing the problems o...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN RU |
| Publicado: |
Penza State University Publishing House
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/3013fa13635740d39c1fd89306b91285 |
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| Sumario: | Background. The right to freedom of scientific creativity is provided for by international
acts on human rights, as well as constitutions of many countries of the world.
At the same time, the emerging close dependence of mankind on technological progress is
increasingly actualizing the problems of possible restrictions on this freedom. In foreign
law, a special approach has been formed that involves an ethical assessment of the potential
consequences of possible discoveries. On its basis, the limitations of scientific activity are
formulated. This also led to the emergence of a new term – creative activity, sensitive to
values – “Value sensitive design (VSD)”, denoting the concept of an ethical approach in
engineering and technological innovation. The purpose of the work is to carry out a systematic
analysis of the content of the right to freedom of scientific creativity, to systematize
the grounds for restricting this freedom, to identify the main problems of legal regulation of
creative activity. Materials and methods. The research problems were solved thanks to the
scientific analysis of a wide range of sources devoted to the right to freedom of scientific
creativity. As a research method, the comparative legal method was used, which made it
possible to identify foreign models of regulation of the stated problems. Results. The general
conclusion about the possibility of limiting the freedom of scientific creativity, which is
not an absolute human right, is presented. Modern legislation establishes some prohibitions
on the fields of scientific activity. This practice is expanding to individual technologies that
have an aggressive effect on human nature. Conclusions. The article identifies the prospects
for such regulation models as risk management of new technologies and scientific creativity
based on common human values. In each case, requirements are put forward for predicting
the consequences of the discovery, minimizing possible negative consequences. This leads
to the introduction of special rules in certain branches of legislation. |
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