Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games

Abstract When individuals extract benefits from multiple resources, the decision they face is twofold: besides choosing how much total effort to exert for extraction, they must also decide how to allocate this effort. We focus on the allocation aspect of this choice in an iterated game played on bip...

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Autores principales:	Andrew Schauf, Poong Oh
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/311552ec131144e2972241cdc4aa7e8e
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:311552ec131144e2972241cdc4aa7e8e2021-12-02T14:01:24ZMyopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games10.1038/s41598-020-79514-52045-2322https://doaj.org/article/311552ec131144e2972241cdc4aa7e8e2021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-79514-5https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract When individuals extract benefits from multiple resources, the decision they face is twofold: besides choosing how much total effort to exert for extraction, they must also decide how to allocate this effort. We focus on the allocation aspect of this choice in an iterated game played on bipartite networks of agents and common-pool resources (CPRs) that degrade linearly in quality as extraction increases. When CPR users attempt to reallocate their extraction efforts among resources to maximize their own payoffs in the very next round (that is, myopically), collective wealth is increased. Using a heterogeneous mean-field approach, we estimate how these reallocations affect the payoffs of CPR users of different degrees within networks having different levels of degree heterogeneity. Focusing specifically on Nash equilibrium initial conditions, which represent the patterns of over-exploitation that result from rational extraction, we find that networks with greater heterogeneity among CPR degrees show greater improvements over equilibrium due to reallocation. When the marginal utility of extraction diminishes, these reallocations also reduce wealth inequality. These findings emphasize that CPR users’ adaptive reallocations of effort—a behavior that previously-studied network evolutionary game models typically disallow by construction—can serve to direct individuals’ self-interest toward the collective good.Andrew SchaufPoong OhNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-10 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Andrew Schauf Poong Oh Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games
description	Abstract When individuals extract benefits from multiple resources, the decision they face is twofold: besides choosing how much total effort to exert for extraction, they must also decide how to allocate this effort. We focus on the allocation aspect of this choice in an iterated game played on bipartite networks of agents and common-pool resources (CPRs) that degrade linearly in quality as extraction increases. When CPR users attempt to reallocate their extraction efforts among resources to maximize their own payoffs in the very next round (that is, myopically), collective wealth is increased. Using a heterogeneous mean-field approach, we estimate how these reallocations affect the payoffs of CPR users of different degrees within networks having different levels of degree heterogeneity. Focusing specifically on Nash equilibrium initial conditions, which represent the patterns of over-exploitation that result from rational extraction, we find that networks with greater heterogeneity among CPR degrees show greater improvements over equilibrium due to reallocation. When the marginal utility of extraction diminishes, these reallocations also reduce wealth inequality. These findings emphasize that CPR users’ adaptive reallocations of effort—a behavior that previously-studied network evolutionary game models typically disallow by construction—can serve to direct individuals’ self-interest toward the collective good.
format	article
author	Andrew Schauf Poong Oh
author_facet	Andrew Schauf Poong Oh
author_sort	Andrew Schauf
title	Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games
title_short	Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games
title_full	Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games
title_fullStr	Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games
title_full_unstemmed	Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games
title_sort	myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/311552ec131144e2972241cdc4aa7e8e
work_keys_str_mv	AT andrewschauf myopicreallocationofextractionimprovescollectiveoutcomesinnetworkedcommonpoolresourcegames AT poongoh myopicreallocationofextractionimprovescollectiveoutcomesinnetworkedcommonpoolresourcegames
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Myopic reallocation of extraction improves collective outcomes in networked common-pool resource games

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