The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society

Abstract Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing...

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Autores principales:	Denis Tverskoi, Athmanathan Senthilnathan, Sergey Gavrilets
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/324b967dcbf3438eadeeda9d77be0f87
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:324b967dcbf3438eadeeda9d77be0f872021-12-02T18:13:45ZThe dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society10.1038/s41598-021-97863-72045-2322https://doaj.org/article/324b967dcbf3438eadeeda9d77be0f872021-09-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-97863-7https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing powers. Both individuals within groups and groups themselves participate in collective actions. The groups are also engaged in political contests over power which determines how jointly produced resources are divided. Using analytical approximations and agent-based simulations, we show that the model exhibits rich behavior characterized by multiple stable equilibria and, under some conditions, non-equilibrium dynamics. We demonstrate that societies in which individuals act independently are more stable than those in which actions of individuals are completely synchronized. We show that mechanisms preventing politically powerful groups from bending the rules of competition in their favor play a key role in promoting between-group cooperation and reducing inequality between groups. We also show that small groups can be more successful in competition than large groups if the jointly-produced goods are rivalrous and the potential benefit of cooperation is relatively small. Otherwise large groups dominate. Overall our model contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of variation between societies in terms of the economic and political inequality within them.Denis TverskoiAthmanathan SenthilnathanSergey GavriletsNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-16 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Denis Tverskoi Athmanathan Senthilnathan Sergey Gavrilets The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
description	Abstract Most human societies are characterized by the presence of different identity groups which cooperate but also compete for resources and power. To deepen our understanding of the underlying social dynamics, we model a society subdivided into groups with constant sizes and dynamically changing powers. Both individuals within groups and groups themselves participate in collective actions. The groups are also engaged in political contests over power which determines how jointly produced resources are divided. Using analytical approximations and agent-based simulations, we show that the model exhibits rich behavior characterized by multiple stable equilibria and, under some conditions, non-equilibrium dynamics. We demonstrate that societies in which individuals act independently are more stable than those in which actions of individuals are completely synchronized. We show that mechanisms preventing politically powerful groups from bending the rules of competition in their favor play a key role in promoting between-group cooperation and reducing inequality between groups. We also show that small groups can be more successful in competition than large groups if the jointly-produced goods are rivalrous and the potential benefit of cooperation is relatively small. Otherwise large groups dominate. Overall our model contributes towards a better understanding of the causes of variation between societies in terms of the economic and political inequality within them.
format	article
author	Denis Tverskoi Athmanathan Senthilnathan Sergey Gavrilets
author_facet	Denis Tverskoi Athmanathan Senthilnathan Sergey Gavrilets
author_sort	Denis Tverskoi
title	The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
title_short	The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
title_full	The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
title_fullStr	The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
title_full_unstemmed	The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
title_sort	dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/324b967dcbf3438eadeeda9d77be0f87
work_keys_str_mv	AT denistverskoi thedynamicsofcooperationpowerandinequalityinagroupstructuredsociety AT athmanathansenthilnathan thedynamicsofcooperationpowerandinequalityinagroupstructuredsociety AT sergeygavrilets thedynamicsofcooperationpowerandinequalityinagroupstructuredsociety AT denistverskoi dynamicsofcooperationpowerandinequalityinagroupstructuredsociety AT athmanathansenthilnathan dynamicsofcooperationpowerandinequalityinagroupstructuredsociety AT sergeygavrilets dynamicsofcooperationpowerandinequalityinagroupstructuredsociety
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The dynamics of cooperation, power, and inequality in a group-structured society

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