Social Ontology and Immanent Realism

What are the intentional objects of groups’ beliefs? This paper claims that they are immanent facts, i.e., facts which exist only within groups’ minds. Since in relevant literature the notion of immanent object and the related theory of “immanent realism” arise in connection with the work of Franz...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal:	Alessandro Salice
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	social facts immanent facts cultural reality social ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/33092d95336d4b85b7a9324d33cd6c6a
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:33092d95336d4b85b7a9324d33cd6c6a
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:33092d95336d4b85b7a9324d33cd6c6a2021-12-02T11:09:37ZSocial Ontology and Immanent Realism10.13128/Phe_Mi-196092280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/33092d95336d4b85b7a9324d33cd6c6a2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7091https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 What are the intentional objects of groups’ beliefs? This paper claims that they are immanent facts, i.e., facts which exist only within groups’ minds. Since in relevant literature the notion of immanent object and the related theory of “immanent realism” arise in connection with the work of Franz Brentano, the paper begins by briefly sharing historical information on Brentano, making clear why – contrary to common belief – Brentano did not argue for immanent realism in his work. In a second part, I then look more closely at groups’ beliefs and illustrate why the insight of immanent realism – despite its historically inadequate reconstruction – can bear on my initial question. In doing so, I pay particular attention to John Searle’s theory of institutional facts, using it as a conceptual basis to develop my own pseudo-Brentanian approach. This approach allows me to introduce a further class of social entities in the last part of the paper: contrary to institutional facts the immanent entities of collective beliefs presuppose neither the assignment of functions nor the generation of deontologies, but they do presuppose groups’ beliefs for their existence. Being the precipitates of collective experiences, such entities are intrinsically related with the first plural person perspective and hence play an important role in what we may call the “cultural layer” of social reality. Alessandro SaliceRosenberg & Sellierarticlesocial factsimmanent factscultural realitysocial ontologyAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 3 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	social facts immanent facts cultural reality social ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	social facts immanent facts cultural reality social ontology Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Alessandro Salice Social Ontology and Immanent Realism
description	What are the intentional objects of groups’ beliefs? This paper claims that they are immanent facts, i.e., facts which exist only within groups’ minds. Since in relevant literature the notion of immanent object and the related theory of “immanent realism” arise in connection with the work of Franz Brentano, the paper begins by briefly sharing historical information on Brentano, making clear why – contrary to common belief – Brentano did not argue for immanent realism in his work. In a second part, I then look more closely at groups’ beliefs and illustrate why the insight of immanent realism – despite its historically inadequate reconstruction – can bear on my initial question. In doing so, I pay particular attention to John Searle’s theory of institutional facts, using it as a conceptual basis to develop my own pseudo-Brentanian approach. This approach allows me to introduce a further class of social entities in the last part of the paper: contrary to institutional facts the immanent entities of collective beliefs presuppose neither the assignment of functions nor the generation of deontologies, but they do presuppose groups’ beliefs for their existence. Being the precipitates of collective experiences, such entities are intrinsically related with the first plural person perspective and hence play an important role in what we may call the “cultural layer” of social reality.
format	article
author	Alessandro Salice
author_facet	Alessandro Salice
author_sort	Alessandro Salice
title	Social Ontology and Immanent Realism
title_short	Social Ontology and Immanent Realism
title_full	Social Ontology and Immanent Realism
title_fullStr	Social Ontology and Immanent Realism
title_full_unstemmed	Social Ontology and Immanent Realism
title_sort	social ontology and immanent realism
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/33092d95336d4b85b7a9324d33cd6c6a
work_keys_str_mv	AT alessandrosalice socialontologyandimmanentrealism
_version_	1718396160558759936

Social Ontology and Immanent Realism

Ejemplares similares