Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran

One of the most important parameters for economic growth is industrial development in many developing regions like Iran. The Markazi province in the center of Iran is one of the most important industrial areas in the country, where unplanned economic development in recent decades has led to many soc...

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Autores principales: Samaneh Zahedi, Amir Hedayati Aghmashhadi, Christine Fürst
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Publicado: MDPI AG 2021
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:3498569beec641cabd27dae12229f0c72021-11-25T19:03:47ZOptimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran10.3390/su1322127162071-1050https://doaj.org/article/3498569beec641cabd27dae12229f0c72021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/22/12716https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050One of the most important parameters for economic growth is industrial development in many developing regions like Iran. The Markazi province in the center of Iran is one of the most important industrial areas in the country, where unplanned economic development in recent decades has led to many social and environmental problems. Accordingly, the main organizations involved in industrial development in this region are facing difficulties in the future development of industrial areas, which has become a complex problem. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to study the industrial development dispute in the Markazi province through a cooperative model of game theory in order to achieve conflict resolution through a comprehensive approach. In this research, the conflict has been analyzed through strategic analysis of stakeholders. For this purpose, a model of cooperative game theory and its bargaining analysis methods, including social choice rules (SCRs) and fallback bargaining (FB), and six available options were used. According to the six SCRs, the most likely option that can exist between the Department of the Environment (DOE) and the Industrial and Mining Organization (IMO) is compromise coordination (C). In addition, the results of the Fallback Bargaining (FB) rule in three different forms show that the most appropriate options for agreement between the IMO and DOE are the moderate version of construction through arbitration (TCa) and compromise coordination (C). In fact, the results indicate that if the actors involved in this conflict do not cooperate to resolve it, it can lead to more complex problems and the involvement of other groups who may not even have a proper perception of the conflict. In addition, the findings show that cooperation between the parties and understanding of their positions and views along with the policy coherence are necessary to strive for sustainable development and maintain economic growth and development.Samaneh ZahediAmir Hedayati AghmashhadiChristine FürstMDPI AGarticleindustrial developmentconflict resolutioncooperative game theoryIranEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 12716, p 12716 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic industrial development
conflict resolution
cooperative game theory
Iran
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
spellingShingle industrial development
conflict resolution
cooperative game theory
Iran
Environmental effects of industries and plants
TD194-195
Renewable energy sources
TJ807-830
Environmental sciences
GE1-350
Samaneh Zahedi
Amir Hedayati Aghmashhadi
Christine Fürst
Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran
description One of the most important parameters for economic growth is industrial development in many developing regions like Iran. The Markazi province in the center of Iran is one of the most important industrial areas in the country, where unplanned economic development in recent decades has led to many social and environmental problems. Accordingly, the main organizations involved in industrial development in this region are facing difficulties in the future development of industrial areas, which has become a complex problem. Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to study the industrial development dispute in the Markazi province through a cooperative model of game theory in order to achieve conflict resolution through a comprehensive approach. In this research, the conflict has been analyzed through strategic analysis of stakeholders. For this purpose, a model of cooperative game theory and its bargaining analysis methods, including social choice rules (SCRs) and fallback bargaining (FB), and six available options were used. According to the six SCRs, the most likely option that can exist between the Department of the Environment (DOE) and the Industrial and Mining Organization (IMO) is compromise coordination (C). In addition, the results of the Fallback Bargaining (FB) rule in three different forms show that the most appropriate options for agreement between the IMO and DOE are the moderate version of construction through arbitration (TCa) and compromise coordination (C). In fact, the results indicate that if the actors involved in this conflict do not cooperate to resolve it, it can lead to more complex problems and the involvement of other groups who may not even have a proper perception of the conflict. In addition, the findings show that cooperation between the parties and understanding of their positions and views along with the policy coherence are necessary to strive for sustainable development and maintain economic growth and development.
format article
author Samaneh Zahedi
Amir Hedayati Aghmashhadi
Christine Fürst
author_facet Samaneh Zahedi
Amir Hedayati Aghmashhadi
Christine Fürst
author_sort Samaneh Zahedi
title Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran
title_short Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran
title_full Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran
title_fullStr Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Politics of Conflict over Physical-Industrial Development Using a Technique of Cooperative Game Theory in Iran
title_sort optimal politics of conflict over physical-industrial development using a technique of cooperative game theory in iran
publisher MDPI AG
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/3498569beec641cabd27dae12229f0c7
work_keys_str_mv AT samanehzahedi optimalpoliticsofconflictoverphysicalindustrialdevelopmentusingatechniqueofcooperativegametheoryiniran
AT amirhedayatiaghmashhadi optimalpoliticsofconflictoverphysicalindustrialdevelopmentusingatechniqueofcooperativegametheoryiniran
AT christinefurst optimalpoliticsofconflictoverphysicalindustrialdevelopmentusingatechniqueofcooperativegametheoryiniran
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