Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies

This paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life as...

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Autores principales:	Paris Adler, Drusilla Brown, Rajeev Dehejia, George Domat, Raymond Robertson
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	World Scientific Publishing 2017
Materias:	apparel human resource management working conditions Viet Nam Social sciences and state - Asia (Asian studies only) H53
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/36014ff0b710478baace3140e25aa13b
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:36014ff0b710478baace3140e25aa13b2021-12-02T12:20:35ZDo Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies0116-11051996-724110.1162/ADEV_a_00081https://doaj.org/article/36014ff0b710478baace3140e25aa13b2017-03-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ADEV_a_00081https://doaj.org/toc/0116-1105https://doaj.org/toc/1996-7241This paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life assessments and reduce measures of depression and traumatic stress. We find significant deviations in manager perceptions of working conditions from those of workers. These deviations significantly impact a worker's perception of well-being and indicators of mental health. Such deviations may lead the factory manager to underprovide certain workplace amenities relative to the cost-minimizing configuration, which may in part explain the persistence of relatively poor working conditions in developing economies.Paris AdlerDrusilla BrownRajeev DehejiaGeorge DomatRaymond RobertsonWorld Scientific Publishingarticleapparelhuman resource managementworking conditionsViet NamSocial sciences and state - Asia (Asian studies only)H53ENAsian Development Review, Vol 34, Iss 1, Pp 65-87 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	apparel human resource management working conditions Viet Nam Social sciences and state - Asia (Asian studies only) H53
spellingShingle	apparel human resource management working conditions Viet Nam Social sciences and state - Asia (Asian studies only) H53 Paris Adler Drusilla Brown Rajeev Dehejia George Domat Raymond Robertson Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
description	This paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life assessments and reduce measures of depression and traumatic stress. We find significant deviations in manager perceptions of working conditions from those of workers. These deviations significantly impact a worker's perception of well-being and indicators of mental health. Such deviations may lead the factory manager to underprovide certain workplace amenities relative to the cost-minimizing configuration, which may in part explain the persistence of relatively poor working conditions in developing economies.
format	article
author	Paris Adler Drusilla Brown Rajeev Dehejia George Domat Raymond Robertson
author_facet	Paris Adler Drusilla Brown Rajeev Dehejia George Domat Raymond Robertson
author_sort	Paris Adler
title	Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_short	Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_full	Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_fullStr	Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_full_unstemmed	Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
title_sort	do factory managers know what workers want? manager–worker information asymmetries and pareto optimal human resource management policies
publisher	World Scientific Publishing
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/36014ff0b710478baace3140e25aa13b
work_keys_str_mv	AT parisadler dofactorymanagersknowwhatworkerswantmanagerworkerinformationasymmetriesandparetooptimalhumanresourcemanagementpolicies AT drusillabrown dofactorymanagersknowwhatworkerswantmanagerworkerinformationasymmetriesandparetooptimalhumanresourcemanagementpolicies AT rajeevdehejia dofactorymanagersknowwhatworkerswantmanagerworkerinformationasymmetriesandparetooptimalhumanresourcemanagementpolicies AT georgedomat dofactorymanagersknowwhatworkerswantmanagerworkerinformationasymmetriesandparetooptimalhumanresourcemanagementpolicies AT raymondrobertson dofactorymanagersknowwhatworkerswantmanagerworkerinformationasymmetriesandparetooptimalhumanresourcemanagementpolicies
_version_	1718394506700652544

Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies

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