A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory

Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertic...

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Autores principales: Jida Liu, Yanan Guo, Shi An, Chenxi Lian
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: MDPI AG 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/369ccb346fc244f29bd1647e9225645b
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:369ccb346fc244f29bd1647e9225645b2021-11-11T16:43:40ZA Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory10.3390/ijerph1821116241660-46011661-7827https://doaj.org/article/369ccb346fc244f29bd1647e9225645b2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/18/21/11624https://doaj.org/toc/1661-7827https://doaj.org/toc/1660-4601Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.Jida LiuYanan GuoShi AnChenxi LianMDPI AGarticlenatural disastersemergency managementevolutionary gamecross-regionalemergency cooperationMedicineRENInternational Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, Vol 18, Iss 11624, p 11624 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic natural disasters
emergency management
evolutionary game
cross-regional
emergency cooperation
Medicine
R
spellingShingle natural disasters
emergency management
evolutionary game
cross-regional
emergency cooperation
Medicine
R
Jida Liu
Yanan Guo
Shi An
Chenxi Lian
A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
description Natural disasters have obvious cross-regional and compound characteristics. Cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters deepens the diversification of coordination relations and the complexity of interaction modes among emergency response organizations, including horizontal and vertical organizational interactions. In order to clarify the cooperation mechanism of emergency organizations during cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters and to explore the key factors that affect the cooperative relationships of emergency organizations, in this study, a game model is constructed based on evolutionary game theory, which is composed of local, neighboring, and central governments. Then, the stability of the emergency game strategy is analyzed. On this basis, a numerical simulation is used to simulate the dynamic evolution trajectory of the game system. The results show that there is an embedded mutual promotion mechanism that evolves towards a positive emergency strategy combination among the game subjects. The selection strategies of the game subjects show the characteristics of consistency and the following: enhanced cooperation efficiency between local and neighboring governments, emergency capital stock, and shared resources, therefore, guiding social emergency forces to actively participate in emergency operations. Strengthening the emergency dispatching strength of the central government and the effectiveness of central–local emergency dispatching, can support the performance of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters. Furthermore, the efficiency of cooperation between local and neighboring governments will be enhanced.
format article
author Jida Liu
Yanan Guo
Shi An
Chenxi Lian
author_facet Jida Liu
Yanan Guo
Shi An
Chenxi Lian
author_sort Jida Liu
title A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
title_short A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
title_full A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
title_fullStr A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
title_full_unstemmed A Study on the Mechanism and Strategy of Cross-Regional Emergency Cooperation for Natural Disasters in China—Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game Theory
title_sort study on the mechanism and strategy of cross-regional emergency cooperation for natural disasters in china—based on the perspective of evolutionary game theory
publisher MDPI AG
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/369ccb346fc244f29bd1647e9225645b
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