The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs

While prototypical uses of slurs express contempt for targets, some reclaimed uses are associated with positive evaluations. This practice may raise concerns. I anticipate this criticism in what I dub the Warrant Argument (WA) and then defend the legitimacy of this kind of reclamation. For the WA, s...

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Autor principal:	Bianca Cepollaro
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	CS EN SK
Publicado:	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2021
Materias:	hate speech polarity reversal reclamation reverse racism reverse sexism slurs Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28309 https://doaj.org/article/36c8778b94614a858c103c9cea814651
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:36c8778b94614a858c103c9cea8146512021-11-30T16:25:40ZThe Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurshttps://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.283091335-06682585-7150https://doaj.org/article/36c8778b94614a858c103c9cea8146512021-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/09211814orgf.2021.28309.pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/1335-0668https://doaj.org/toc/2585-7150While prototypical uses of slurs express contempt for targets, some reclaimed uses are associated with positive evaluations. This practice may raise concerns. I anticipate this criticism in what I dub the Warrant Argument (WA) and then defend the legitimacy of this kind of reclamation. For the WA, standard pejorative uses of slurs are problematic for assuming unwarranted connections between descriptive properties (e.g., being gay) and value judgements (e.g., being worthy of contempt). When reclaimed uses of slurs express a positive evaluation of their targets—the WA goes—reclamation fails to challenge the unwarranted link between descriptive properties and value judgements, and merely reverses the evaluation polarity from negative to positive. So, the WA concludes, reclaimed uses of slurs evaluating targets positively for belonging to a certain group make a similar moral error as derogatory uses of slurs (sections 2-3). The WA could lead us to condemn reclamation. To resist this conclusion, I draw a parallel with affirmative action, arguing that it can be morally permissible to balance an existing form of injustice by temporarily introducing a countervailing mechanism that prima facie seems to violate the norm of equality: even if the WA were right, it wouldn’t constitute an argument against the moral permissibility of reclamation in the case of most slurs (section 4). This line of argument in defense of pride reclamation may also serve to debunk the myths of reverse racism and reverse sexism (section 5).Bianca CepollaroInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciencesarticlehate speechpolarity reversalreclamationreverse racismreverse sexismslursPhilosophy (General)B1-5802CSENSKOrganon F, Vol 28, Iss 3, Pp 672-688 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	CS EN SK
topic	hate speech polarity reversal reclamation reverse racism reverse sexism slurs Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	hate speech polarity reversal reclamation reverse racism reverse sexism slurs Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Bianca Cepollaro The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs
description	While prototypical uses of slurs express contempt for targets, some reclaimed uses are associated with positive evaluations. This practice may raise concerns. I anticipate this criticism in what I dub the Warrant Argument (WA) and then defend the legitimacy of this kind of reclamation. For the WA, standard pejorative uses of slurs are problematic for assuming unwarranted connections between descriptive properties (e.g., being gay) and value judgements (e.g., being worthy of contempt). When reclaimed uses of slurs express a positive evaluation of their targets—the WA goes—reclamation fails to challenge the unwarranted link between descriptive properties and value judgements, and merely reverses the evaluation polarity from negative to positive. So, the WA concludes, reclaimed uses of slurs evaluating targets positively for belonging to a certain group make a similar moral error as derogatory uses of slurs (sections 2-3). The WA could lead us to condemn reclamation. To resist this conclusion, I draw a parallel with affirmative action, arguing that it can be morally permissible to balance an existing form of injustice by temporarily introducing a countervailing mechanism that prima facie seems to violate the norm of equality: even if the WA were right, it wouldn’t constitute an argument against the moral permissibility of reclamation in the case of most slurs (section 4). This line of argument in defense of pride reclamation may also serve to debunk the myths of reverse racism and reverse sexism (section 5).
format	article
author	Bianca Cepollaro
author_facet	Bianca Cepollaro
author_sort	Bianca Cepollaro
title	The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs
title_short	The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs
title_full	The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs
title_fullStr	The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs
title_full_unstemmed	The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs
title_sort	moral status of the reclamation of slurs
publisher	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
publishDate	2021
url	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28309 https://doaj.org/article/36c8778b94614a858c103c9cea814651
work_keys_str_mv	AT biancacepollaro themoralstatusofthereclamationofslurs AT biancacepollaro moralstatusofthereclamationofslurs
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The Moral Status of the Reclamation of Slurs

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