Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access

Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open acces...

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Autores principales:	Jacob P. Ziegler, Sunny L. Jardine, Stuart E. Jones, Brett T. van Poorten, Marco A. Janssen, Christopher T. Solomon
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Resilience Alliance 2021
Materias:	angler collective action common pool resource fish stocking fishery lake association open access polycentric governance social-ecological system Biology (General) QH301-705.5 Ecology QH540-549.5
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/396cb96855614c47be735b635a6f82a1
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:396cb96855614c47be735b635a6f82a12021-11-15T16:40:18ZInvesting in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access1708-308710.5751/ES-12339-260216https://doaj.org/article/396cb96855614c47be735b635a6f82a12021-06-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol26/iss2/art16/https://doaj.org/toc/1708-3087Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open access. We modeled a recreational harvest fishery in which local or centralized managers invest in fish stocking to maximize social welfare. Although classic open access dissipation of rents occurs at equilibrium, the sluggish response of fishing effort to changing conditions allows welfare to accrue in transition to equilibrium. This transient welfare creates persistent incentives to invest. Empirical observations showed that stocking by local collective action groups occurred at rates similar to model-predicted optima, while centralized stocking occurred at rates greater than predicted optima. Our results emphasize the potential benefits of local involvement in managing the commons, even under conditions that were previously thought to preclude effective collective action.Jacob P. ZieglerSunny L. JardineStuart E. JonesBrett T. van PoortenMarco A. JanssenChristopher T. SolomonResilience Alliancearticleanglercollective actioncommon pool resourcefish stockingfisherylake associationopen accesspolycentric governancesocial-ecological systemBiology (General)QH301-705.5EcologyQH540-549.5ENEcology and Society, Vol 26, Iss 2, p 16 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	angler collective action common pool resource fish stocking fishery lake association open access polycentric governance social-ecological system Biology (General) QH301-705.5 Ecology QH540-549.5
spellingShingle	angler collective action common pool resource fish stocking fishery lake association open access polycentric governance social-ecological system Biology (General) QH301-705.5 Ecology QH540-549.5 Jacob P. Ziegler Sunny L. Jardine Stuart E. Jones Brett T. van Poorten Marco A. Janssen Christopher T. Solomon Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
description	Local users may invest in managing common pool resources, thereby promoting social and ecological resilience. Institutional or economic limits on access are regarded as essential preconditions for incentivizing local investments, but we show that investment incentives can exist even under open access. We modeled a recreational harvest fishery in which local or centralized managers invest in fish stocking to maximize social welfare. Although classic open access dissipation of rents occurs at equilibrium, the sluggish response of fishing effort to changing conditions allows welfare to accrue in transition to equilibrium. This transient welfare creates persistent incentives to invest. Empirical observations showed that stocking by local collective action groups occurred at rates similar to model-predicted optima, while centralized stocking occurred at rates greater than predicted optima. Our results emphasize the potential benefits of local involvement in managing the commons, even under conditions that were previously thought to preclude effective collective action.
format	article
author	Jacob P. Ziegler Sunny L. Jardine Stuart E. Jones Brett T. van Poorten Marco A. Janssen Christopher T. Solomon
author_facet	Jacob P. Ziegler Sunny L. Jardine Stuart E. Jones Brett T. van Poorten Marco A. Janssen Christopher T. Solomon
author_sort	Jacob P. Ziegler
title	Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_short	Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_full	Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_fullStr	Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_full_unstemmed	Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
title_sort	investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access
publisher	Resilience Alliance
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/396cb96855614c47be735b635a6f82a1
work_keys_str_mv	AT jacobpziegler investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT sunnyljardine investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT stuartejones investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT bretttvanpoorten investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT marcoajanssen investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess AT christophertsolomon investinginthecommonstransientwelfarecreatesincentivesdespiteopenaccess
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Investing in the commons: transient welfare creates incentives despite open access

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