The 7-Round Subspace Trail-Based Impossible Differential Distinguisher of Midori-64
This paper analyzes the subspace trail of Midori-64 and uses the propagation law and mutual relationship of the subspaces of Midori-64 to provide a 6-round Midori-64 subspace trail-based impossible differential key recovery attack. The data complexity of the attack is 254.6 chosen plaintexts, and th...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Hindawi-Wiley
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/3b33475c759e4137ac2b7c3edfceef95 |
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| Sumario: | This paper analyzes the subspace trail of Midori-64 and uses the propagation law and mutual relationship of the subspaces of Midori-64 to provide a 6-round Midori-64 subspace trail-based impossible differential key recovery attack. The data complexity of the attack is 254.6 chosen plaintexts, and the computational complexity is 258.2 lookup operations. Its overall complexity is less than that of the known 6-round truncated impossible differential distinguisher. This distinguisher is also applicable to Midori-128 with a secret S-box. Additionally, utilizing the properties of subspaces, we prove that a subspace trail-based impossible differential distinguisher of Midori-64 contains at most 7 rounds. This is 1 more than the upper bound of Midori-64’s truncated impossible differential distinguisher which is 6. According to the Hamming weights of the starting and ending subspaces, we classify all 7-round Midori-64 subspace trail-based impossible differential distinguishers into two types and they need 259.6 and 251.4 chosen plaintexts, respectively. |
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