Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory

In recent years, some simulation theorists have claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons provides empirical support for the position that mind reading is, at some basic level, simulation. The purpose of this essay is to question that claim. I begin by providing brief context for the current min...

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Autor principal:	Timothy A. Burns
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2017
Materias:	empathy phenomenology simulation-theory mirror neurons intersubjectivity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/3d3e36486dcb42b1b648cd377d07a6d1
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:3d3e36486dcb42b1b648cd377d07a6d1
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:3d3e36486dcb42b1b648cd377d07a6d12021-12-02T10:23:38ZEmpathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory10.13128/Phe_Mi-211192280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/3d3e36486dcb42b1b648cd377d07a6d12017-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7279https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 In recent years, some simulation theorists have claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons provides empirical support for the position that mind reading is, at some basic level, simulation. The purpose of this essay is to question that claim. I begin by providing brief context for the current mind reading debate and then developing an influential simulationist account of mind reading. I then draw on the works of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein to develop an alternative, phenomenological account. In conclusion, I offer multiple objections against simulation theory and argue that the empirical evidence mirror neurons offer us does not necessarily support the view that empathy is simulation. Timothy A. BurnsRosenberg & Sellierarticleempathyphenomenologysimulation-theorymirror neuronsintersubjectivityAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 12 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	empathy phenomenology simulation-theory mirror neurons intersubjectivity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	empathy phenomenology simulation-theory mirror neurons intersubjectivity Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Timothy A. Burns Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory
description	In recent years, some simulation theorists have claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons provides empirical support for the position that mind reading is, at some basic level, simulation. The purpose of this essay is to question that claim. I begin by providing brief context for the current mind reading debate and then developing an influential simulationist account of mind reading. I then draw on the works of Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein to develop an alternative, phenomenological account. In conclusion, I offer multiple objections against simulation theory and argue that the empirical evidence mirror neurons offer us does not necessarily support the view that empathy is simulation.
format	article
author	Timothy A. Burns
author_facet	Timothy A. Burns
author_sort	Timothy A. Burns
title	Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory
title_short	Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory
title_full	Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory
title_fullStr	Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory
title_full_unstemmed	Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory
title_sort	empathy, simulation, and neuroscience: a phenomenological case against simulation-theory
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/3d3e36486dcb42b1b648cd377d07a6d1
work_keys_str_mv	AT timothyaburns empathysimulationandneuroscienceaphenomenologicalcaseagainstsimulationtheory
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Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory

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