Empathy, Simulation, and Neuroscience: A Phenomenological Case against Simulation-Theory
In recent years, some simulation theorists have claimed that the discovery of mirror neurons provides empirical support for the position that mind reading is, at some basic level, simulation. The purpose of this essay is to question that claim. I begin by providing brief context for the current min...
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Main Author: | Timothy A. Burns |
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Format: | article |
Language: | EN FR IT |
Published: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Online Access: | https://doaj.org/article/3d3e36486dcb42b1b648cd377d07a6d1 |
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