Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation

Abstract Reputation-based cooperation is often observed in modern society. People gain several types of information by assessing others. Among these, the most important information is the actions of people and those of their recipients. However, almost all studies assume that people consider all of...

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Autores principales: Isamu Okada, Hitoshi Yamamoto, Yoshiki Sato, Satoshi Uchida, Tatsuya Sasaki
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2018
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/3e0a2d272bd94aee95423555bb7e3b86
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:3e0a2d272bd94aee95423555bb7e3b862021-12-02T11:41:25ZExperimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation10.1038/s41598-018-33147-x2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/3e0a2d272bd94aee95423555bb7e3b862018-10-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-33147-xhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Reputation-based cooperation is often observed in modern society. People gain several types of information by assessing others. Among these, the most important information is the actions of people and those of their recipients. However, almost all studies assume that people consider all of the information they receive. This assumption is extreme, and people engaging in reputation-based cooperation may not pay attention to some information, i.e., they may display selective inattention. We demonstrate that subjects’ decision-making in relation to cooperative action depends on the content of the information they receive about their recipients. Our results show that subjects either consider or ignore information depending on the content of that information. When their recipients had cooperated previously, subjects cooperated without considering the information they received. When the recipients had played before with those who had bad reputations, subjects did not use that information, regardless of whether it was disclosed proactively. In other cases, subjects considered information on both the previous actions of recipients and those of the recipients’ own recipients. We found that subjects did not always use the information to make decisions, although they willingly received information about their recipients. This supports the proposition that selective inattention occurs in reputation-based cooperation.Isamu OkadaHitoshi YamamotoYoshiki SatoSatoshi UchidaTatsuya SasakiNature PortfolioarticleReputation-based CooperationSelective InattentionIndirect ReciprocityAssessment RulesInformation Disclosure BehaviorMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 1-7 (2018)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Reputation-based Cooperation
Selective Inattention
Indirect Reciprocity
Assessment Rules
Information Disclosure Behavior
Medicine
R
Science
Q
spellingShingle Reputation-based Cooperation
Selective Inattention
Indirect Reciprocity
Assessment Rules
Information Disclosure Behavior
Medicine
R
Science
Q
Isamu Okada
Hitoshi Yamamoto
Yoshiki Sato
Satoshi Uchida
Tatsuya Sasaki
Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation
description Abstract Reputation-based cooperation is often observed in modern society. People gain several types of information by assessing others. Among these, the most important information is the actions of people and those of their recipients. However, almost all studies assume that people consider all of the information they receive. This assumption is extreme, and people engaging in reputation-based cooperation may not pay attention to some information, i.e., they may display selective inattention. We demonstrate that subjects’ decision-making in relation to cooperative action depends on the content of the information they receive about their recipients. Our results show that subjects either consider or ignore information depending on the content of that information. When their recipients had cooperated previously, subjects cooperated without considering the information they received. When the recipients had played before with those who had bad reputations, subjects did not use that information, regardless of whether it was disclosed proactively. In other cases, subjects considered information on both the previous actions of recipients and those of the recipients’ own recipients. We found that subjects did not always use the information to make decisions, although they willingly received information about their recipients. This supports the proposition that selective inattention occurs in reputation-based cooperation.
format article
author Isamu Okada
Hitoshi Yamamoto
Yoshiki Sato
Satoshi Uchida
Tatsuya Sasaki
author_facet Isamu Okada
Hitoshi Yamamoto
Yoshiki Sato
Satoshi Uchida
Tatsuya Sasaki
author_sort Isamu Okada
title Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation
title_short Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation
title_full Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation
title_fullStr Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation
title_full_unstemmed Experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation
title_sort experimental evidence of selective inattention in reputation-based cooperation
publisher Nature Portfolio
publishDate 2018
url https://doaj.org/article/3e0a2d272bd94aee95423555bb7e3b86
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AT hitoshiyamamoto experimentalevidenceofselectiveinattentioninreputationbasedcooperation
AT yoshikisato experimentalevidenceofselectiveinattentioninreputationbasedcooperation
AT satoshiuchida experimentalevidenceofselectiveinattentioninreputationbasedcooperation
AT tatsuyasasaki experimentalevidenceofselectiveinattentioninreputationbasedcooperation
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