The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision

Gordon Tullock is acknowledged for being the first to recognize the true costs of rent-seeking as including not only the Harberger triangle but also the Tullock rectangle. This rectangle does not constitute merely a lossless transfer of wealth, but it causes a misallocation of resources as rent-seek...

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Autor principal:	Michael Makovi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	DE EN FR
Publicado:	Editura ASE Bucuresti 2015
Materias:	Tullock rent-seeking interest groups efficiency subjectivism methodology Economics as a science HB71-74
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/3f5d24ece0434d98ab2e664442e7fe6e
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:3f5d24ece0434d98ab2e664442e7fe6e2021-12-02T00:08:38ZThe welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision1843-22981844-8208https://doaj.org/article/3f5d24ece0434d98ab2e664442e7fe6e2015-11-01T00:00:00Z http://jpe.ro/pdf.php?id=7305 https://doaj.org/toc/1843-2298https://doaj.org/toc/1844-8208Gordon Tullock is acknowledged for being the first to recognize the true costs of rent-seeking as including not only the Harberger triangle but also the Tullock rectangle. This rectangle does not constitute merely a lossless transfer of wealth, but it causes a misallocation of resources as rent-seekers invest resources in lobbying. However, a close reading of Tullock’s writings shows that his arguments are formulated in a holistic fashion, speaking of what is efficient or inefficient for society. Rent-seeking is inefficient because it reduces societal welfare. But according to a methodologically individualist and subjectivist economics, such a claim is invalid. We must distinguish between positive economic fact and normative moral philosophy. We call for a reconstruction of utility and welfare economics based on methodological individualism and subjectivism with implications for the theories of monopoly and competition: practices which Neoclassical perfect-competition theory considers to be evidence of rent-seeking should instead be deemed as indications of genuine competition Political economy should be concerned with ascertaining which institutions will best enable individuals to pursue their individually subjective ends – or else economists should be explicit about their normative preferences and political philosophies.Michael MakoviEditura ASE BucurestiarticleTullockrent-seekinginterest groupsefficiencysubjectivismmethodologyEconomics as a scienceHB71-74DEENFRJournal of Philosophical Economics, Vol IX, Iss 1, Pp 73-101 (2015)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	DE EN FR
topic	Tullock rent-seeking interest groups efficiency subjectivism methodology Economics as a science HB71-74
spellingShingle	Tullock rent-seeking interest groups efficiency subjectivism methodology Economics as a science HB71-74 Michael Makovi The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision
description	Gordon Tullock is acknowledged for being the first to recognize the true costs of rent-seeking as including not only the Harberger triangle but also the Tullock rectangle. This rectangle does not constitute merely a lossless transfer of wealth, but it causes a misallocation of resources as rent-seekers invest resources in lobbying. However, a close reading of Tullock’s writings shows that his arguments are formulated in a holistic fashion, speaking of what is efficient or inefficient for society. Rent-seeking is inefficient because it reduces societal welfare. But according to a methodologically individualist and subjectivist economics, such a claim is invalid. We must distinguish between positive economic fact and normative moral philosophy. We call for a reconstruction of utility and welfare economics based on methodological individualism and subjectivism with implications for the theories of monopoly and competition: practices which Neoclassical perfect-competition theory considers to be evidence of rent-seeking should instead be deemed as indications of genuine competition Political economy should be concerned with ascertaining which institutions will best enable individuals to pursue their individually subjective ends – or else economists should be explicit about their normative preferences and political philosophies.
format	article
author	Michael Makovi
author_facet	Michael Makovi
author_sort	Michael Makovi
title	The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision
title_short	The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision
title_full	The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision
title_fullStr	The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision
title_full_unstemmed	The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision
title_sort	welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision
publisher	Editura ASE Bucuresti
publishDate	2015
url	https://doaj.org/article/3f5d24ece0434d98ab2e664442e7fe6e
work_keys_str_mv	AT michaelmakovi thewelfarecostsofrentseekingamethodologicallyindividualistandsubjectivistrevision AT michaelmakovi welfarecostsofrentseekingamethodologicallyindividualistandsubjectivistrevision
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The welfare costs of rent-seeking: a methodologically individualist and subjectivist revision

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