Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?

The concepts of superindividual mind and superindividual person represent a double ontological challenge: in formal ontology, as higher order objects; in regional ontology, as minds and persons. I will discuss Stein’s (1922) phenomenological description of common intentionality and her accounts of...

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Autor principal: Emanuele Caminada
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Publicado: Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:3f77280ec0b841e0a5834087458c457e2021-12-02T09:29:57ZHigher-order persons: an ontological challenge?10.13128/Phe_Mi-196532280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/3f77280ec0b841e0a5834087458c457e2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7061https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 The concepts of superindividual mind and superindividual person represent a double ontological challenge: in formal ontology, as higher order objects; in regional ontology, as minds and persons. I will discuss Stein’s (1922) phenomenological description of common intentionality and her accounts of individual and superindividual personality and personhood in Social Ontology. Her argumentation is first to be proved within other phenomenological accounts, particulary in comparison with Husserl’s concept of higher order person (Personalität höherer Ordnung), Scheler’s total person (Gesamtperson) and Gallagher and Zahavi’s philosophy of mind (2008). Finally I will try to compare it with Petitt’s concept of group mind, stressing Stein’s distinction between stream of consciosness and stream of experience and the way the latter is founded on the former. Emanuele CaminadaRosenberg & Sellierarticlepersongroup mindcollective intentionalitysocial ontologyformal ontologyAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
FR
IT
topic person
group mind
collective intentionality
social ontology
formal ontology
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
spellingShingle person
group mind
collective intentionality
social ontology
formal ontology
Aesthetics
BH1-301
Ethics
BJ1-1725
Emanuele Caminada
Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?
description The concepts of superindividual mind and superindividual person represent a double ontological challenge: in formal ontology, as higher order objects; in regional ontology, as minds and persons. I will discuss Stein’s (1922) phenomenological description of common intentionality and her accounts of individual and superindividual personality and personhood in Social Ontology. Her argumentation is first to be proved within other phenomenological accounts, particulary in comparison with Husserl’s concept of higher order person (Personalität höherer Ordnung), Scheler’s total person (Gesamtperson) and Gallagher and Zahavi’s philosophy of mind (2008). Finally I will try to compare it with Petitt’s concept of group mind, stressing Stein’s distinction between stream of consciosness and stream of experience and the way the latter is founded on the former.
format article
author Emanuele Caminada
author_facet Emanuele Caminada
author_sort Emanuele Caminada
title Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?
title_short Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?
title_full Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?
title_fullStr Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?
title_full_unstemmed Higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?
title_sort higher-order persons: an ontological challenge?
publisher Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate 2016
url https://doaj.org/article/3f77280ec0b841e0a5834087458c457e
work_keys_str_mv AT emanuelecaminada higherorderpersonsanontologicalchallenge
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