AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO

The United States is indisputable global leader in utilizing tools of economic statecraft to secure national interests both through rewarding foreign countries for policies conforming the Washington interests and through punishing them for a deviant behavior. Foreign assistance is one of such mechan...

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Autor principal:	V. I. Bartenev
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN RU
Publicado:	MGIMO University Press 2019
Materias:	united states foreign assistance economic sanctions deviant behavior coercion expropriation military coup human rights terrorism nuclear non-proliferation International relations JZ2-6530
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/3fae6c333f0e4fd6861bdd69f50f5ad1
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:3fae6c333f0e4fd6861bdd69f50f5ad12021-11-23T14:50:41ZAID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO2071-81602541-909910.24833/2071-8160-2018-6-63-110-140https://doaj.org/article/3fae6c333f0e4fd6861bdd69f50f5ad12019-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/820https://doaj.org/toc/2071-8160https://doaj.org/toc/2541-9099The United States is indisputable global leader in utilizing tools of economic statecraft to secure national interests both through rewarding foreign countries for policies conforming the Washington interests and through punishing them for a deviant behavior. Foreign assistance is one of such mechanisms of global influence. This paper examines the issue of aid prohibition. The first section contains a catalog and an original typology of effective universal (not country-specific) restrictions on foreign aid provision based on the type of the recipient government’s actions or inactions through its domestic policy or international behavior that trigger harming the U.S. economic interests. The paper demonstrates that such a typology is equally applicable to the U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid and invites to differentiate between the restrictions within one category depending on whether they are imposed in response to the recipient’s actions against the United States or to its international policy as a whole. The second section assess the extent to which the U.S. government is consistent in imposing the aid restrictions. The conclusion is drawn that the U.S. has established a parallel (to the international law) legal regime of aid prohibitions that helps them control the developing countries’ behavior. Most of the active restrictions and prohibitions were imposed during the Cold War but not as byproducts of the bipolarity, which is another illustration of continuity in the U.S. global policies in the 20th and 21st centuries. The imposition of these restrictions reflects not only a diversification of external threats to the U.S. vital interests, but also the logic of the U.S. domestic political process and the legislators’ wish to restrain the executive branch. The President, however, is entitled by law to waive most of the norms out of political or strategic considerations. This helps the U.S. government impose restrictions selectively but does not eliminate a hypothetical risk of aid suspension that can refrain a recipient government from certain domestic or external actions. Nonetheless, the impact of the U.S. aid prohibition as a tool of coercion has been declining because of strengthening of non-Western donors – especially, China, Arab countries, Turkey and Russian Federation.V. I. BartenevMGIMO University Pressarticleunited statesforeign assistanceeconomic sanctionsdeviant behaviorcoercionexpropriationmilitary couphuman rightsterrorismnuclear non-proliferationInternational relationsJZ2-6530ENRUVestnik MGIMO-Universiteta, Vol 0, Iss 6(63), Pp 110-140 (2019)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN RU
topic	united states foreign assistance economic sanctions deviant behavior coercion expropriation military coup human rights terrorism nuclear non-proliferation International relations JZ2-6530
spellingShingle	united states foreign assistance economic sanctions deviant behavior coercion expropriation military coup human rights terrorism nuclear non-proliferation International relations JZ2-6530 V. I. Bartenev AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO
description	The United States is indisputable global leader in utilizing tools of economic statecraft to secure national interests both through rewarding foreign countries for policies conforming the Washington interests and through punishing them for a deviant behavior. Foreign assistance is one of such mechanisms of global influence. This paper examines the issue of aid prohibition. The first section contains a catalog and an original typology of effective universal (not country-specific) restrictions on foreign aid provision based on the type of the recipient government’s actions or inactions through its domestic policy or international behavior that trigger harming the U.S. economic interests. The paper demonstrates that such a typology is equally applicable to the U.S. bilateral and multilateral aid and invites to differentiate between the restrictions within one category depending on whether they are imposed in response to the recipient’s actions against the United States or to its international policy as a whole. The second section assess the extent to which the U.S. government is consistent in imposing the aid restrictions. The conclusion is drawn that the U.S. has established a parallel (to the international law) legal regime of aid prohibitions that helps them control the developing countries’ behavior. Most of the active restrictions and prohibitions were imposed during the Cold War but not as byproducts of the bipolarity, which is another illustration of continuity in the U.S. global policies in the 20th and 21st centuries. The imposition of these restrictions reflects not only a diversification of external threats to the U.S. vital interests, but also the logic of the U.S. domestic political process and the legislators’ wish to restrain the executive branch. The President, however, is entitled by law to waive most of the norms out of political or strategic considerations. This helps the U.S. government impose restrictions selectively but does not eliminate a hypothetical risk of aid suspension that can refrain a recipient government from certain domestic or external actions. Nonetheless, the impact of the U.S. aid prohibition as a tool of coercion has been declining because of strengthening of non-Western donors – especially, China, Arab countries, Turkey and Russian Federation.
format	article
author	V. I. Bartenev
author_facet	V. I. Bartenev
author_sort	V. I. Bartenev
title	AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO
title_short	AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO
title_full	AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO
title_fullStr	AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO
title_full_unstemmed	AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO
title_sort	aid prohibition as a tool of the u.s. foreign policy: de jure and de facto
publisher	MGIMO University Press
publishDate	2019
url	https://doaj.org/article/3fae6c333f0e4fd6861bdd69f50f5ad1
work_keys_str_mv	AT vibartenev aidprohibitionasatooloftheusforeignpolicydejureanddefacto
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AID PROHIBITION AS A TOOL OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: DE JURE AND DE FACTO

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