Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and the Aha! Experience
Elijah Chudnoff’s case for irreducible cognitive phenomenology hinges on seeming to see the truth of a mathematical proposition (Chudnoff 2015). In the following, I develop an augmented version of Chudnoff’s case, not based on seeming to see, or intuition, but based on being in a state with present...
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Autor principal: | John Joseph Dorsch |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
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Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/4342e4e264da4f9d8537fab24473a86d |
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