Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl

Husserl introduced empty intentions into the framework of static phenomenology in order to render intelligible the fact that we are conscious of whole things in perception despite the fact that they are always presented to us only from one side and we don’t have any imaginative or symbolic represen...

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Autor principal:	Rochus Sowa
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	intentionality habituality horizon knowledge Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/45a6686cee36487cb68dda589de57029
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:45a6686cee36487cb68dda589de570292021-12-02T12:19:25ZEpisodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl10.13128/Phe_Mi-195622280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/45a6686cee36487cb68dda589de570292016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7156https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Husserl introduced empty intentions into the framework of static phenomenology in order to render intelligible the fact that we are conscious of whole things in perception despite the fact that they are always presented to us only from one side and we don’t have any imaginative or symbolic representation of all their unseen properties. The article shows that this conception of empty intention is a misconception and that the emptiness that is constitutive for the givenness of whole things in perception is due not to empty intentions but to intentional habitualities, especially to habitual beliefs. These beliefs make up the empty horizons through which we have consciousness of whole things and of the world as a whole. This solution is offered by Husserl in the framework of his genetic phenomenology. Referring to some of Husserl’s genetic pronouncements, the article investigates the constitutive role of two forms of habitual beliefs: beliefs which stem from one’s own experiences and insights and beliefs that stem from other’s experiences or insights and are taken over in good faith. Special attention is paid to this second form of habitual beliefs for the constitution of the world; it is argued that the world-horizon is basically made up of habitual beliefs of this second form. Rochus SowaRosenberg & SellierarticleintentionalityhabitualityhorizonknowledgeAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 6 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	intentionality habituality horizon knowledge Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	intentionality habituality horizon knowledge Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Rochus Sowa Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl
description	Husserl introduced empty intentions into the framework of static phenomenology in order to render intelligible the fact that we are conscious of whole things in perception despite the fact that they are always presented to us only from one side and we don’t have any imaginative or symbolic representation of all their unseen properties. The article shows that this conception of empty intention is a misconception and that the emptiness that is constitutive for the givenness of whole things in perception is due not to empty intentions but to intentional habitualities, especially to habitual beliefs. These beliefs make up the empty horizons through which we have consciousness of whole things and of the world as a whole. This solution is offered by Husserl in the framework of his genetic phenomenology. Referring to some of Husserl’s genetic pronouncements, the article investigates the constitutive role of two forms of habitual beliefs: beliefs which stem from one’s own experiences and insights and beliefs that stem from other’s experiences or insights and are taken over in good faith. Special attention is paid to this second form of habitual beliefs for the constitution of the world; it is argued that the world-horizon is basically made up of habitual beliefs of this second form.
format	article
author	Rochus Sowa
author_facet	Rochus Sowa
author_sort	Rochus Sowa
title	Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl
title_short	Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl
title_full	Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl
title_fullStr	Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl
title_full_unstemmed	Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl
title_sort	episodic and non-episodic intentionality: on the constitutive function of the epistemic habitualities of knowledge and belief in edmund husserl
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/45a6686cee36487cb68dda589de57029
work_keys_str_mv	AT rochussowa episodicandnonepisodicintentionalityontheconstitutivefunctionoftheepistemichabitualitiesofknowledgeandbeliefinedmundhusserl
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Episodic and Non-Episodic Intentionality: on the Constitutive Function of the Epistemic Habitualities of Knowledge and Belief in Edmund Husserl

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