Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study

Abstract The hypothesis of strategic motives postulates that offering fairly in the Ultimatum Game (UG) is to avoid rejection and receive money. In this fMRI study, we used a modified UG to elucidate how proposers reached decisions of offering fairly and to what extent they considered offering selfi...

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Autores principales:	Yin-Hua Chen, Ying-Chun Chen, Wen-Jui Kuo, Kamhon Kan, C. C. Yang, Nai-Shing Yen
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2017
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/45b6146a30cc4c158ecfda1de991f85d
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:45b6146a30cc4c158ecfda1de991f85d2021-12-02T12:32:12ZStrategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study10.1038/s41598-017-00608-82045-2322https://doaj.org/article/45b6146a30cc4c158ecfda1de991f85d2017-04-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-00608-8https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract The hypothesis of strategic motives postulates that offering fairly in the Ultimatum Game (UG) is to avoid rejection and receive money. In this fMRI study, we used a modified UG to elucidate how proposers reached decisions of offering fairly and to what extent they considered offering selfishly with different stakes. We had proposers choose between a fair and a selfish offer with different degrees of selfishness and stake sizes. Proposers were less likely and spent more time choosing the fair offer over a slightly-selfish offer than a very selfish offer independent of stakes. Such choices evoked greater activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortices that typically involve in allocation of cognitive control for cost/benefit decision making. Choosing a fair offer in higher stakes evoked greater activation in the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) and the areas that previously have been implicated in reward and theory of mind. Furthermore, choosing a slightly selfish offer over a fair offer evoked greater activation in the anterior cingulate sulcus, ACCg, ventral tegmental area (or substantia nigra) and anterior insular cortex signalling the higher gain and implying higher rejection risk. In conclusion, our findings favoured the hypothesis that proposers offer fairly based on the strategic motives.Yin-Hua ChenYing-Chun ChenWen-Jui KuoKamhon KanC. C. YangNai-Shing YenNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-11 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Yin-Hua Chen Ying-Chun Chen Wen-Jui Kuo Kamhon Kan C. C. Yang Nai-Shing Yen Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study
description	Abstract The hypothesis of strategic motives postulates that offering fairly in the Ultimatum Game (UG) is to avoid rejection and receive money. In this fMRI study, we used a modified UG to elucidate how proposers reached decisions of offering fairly and to what extent they considered offering selfishly with different stakes. We had proposers choose between a fair and a selfish offer with different degrees of selfishness and stake sizes. Proposers were less likely and spent more time choosing the fair offer over a slightly-selfish offer than a very selfish offer independent of stakes. Such choices evoked greater activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortices that typically involve in allocation of cognitive control for cost/benefit decision making. Choosing a fair offer in higher stakes evoked greater activation in the anterior cingulate gyrus (ACCg) and the areas that previously have been implicated in reward and theory of mind. Furthermore, choosing a slightly selfish offer over a fair offer evoked greater activation in the anterior cingulate sulcus, ACCg, ventral tegmental area (or substantia nigra) and anterior insular cortex signalling the higher gain and implying higher rejection risk. In conclusion, our findings favoured the hypothesis that proposers offer fairly based on the strategic motives.
format	article
author	Yin-Hua Chen Ying-Chun Chen Wen-Jui Kuo Kamhon Kan C. C. Yang Nai-Shing Yen
author_facet	Yin-Hua Chen Ying-Chun Chen Wen-Jui Kuo Kamhon Kan C. C. Yang Nai-Shing Yen
author_sort	Yin-Hua Chen
title	Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study
title_short	Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study
title_full	Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study
title_fullStr	Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study
title_full_unstemmed	Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study
title_sort	strategic motives drive proposers to offer fairly in ultimatum games: an fmri study
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/45b6146a30cc4c158ecfda1de991f85d
work_keys_str_mv	AT yinhuachen strategicmotivesdriveproposerstoofferfairlyinultimatumgamesanfmristudy AT yingchunchen strategicmotivesdriveproposerstoofferfairlyinultimatumgamesanfmristudy AT wenjuikuo strategicmotivesdriveproposerstoofferfairlyinultimatumgamesanfmristudy AT kamhonkan strategicmotivesdriveproposerstoofferfairlyinultimatumgamesanfmristudy AT ccyang strategicmotivesdriveproposerstoofferfairlyinultimatumgamesanfmristudy AT naishingyen strategicmotivesdriveproposerstoofferfairlyinultimatumgamesanfmristudy
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Strategic Motives Drive Proposers to Offer Fairly in Ultimatum Games: An fMRI Study

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