Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness

Abstract We focus on the impacts of technological spillovers and environmental awareness in a two-echelon supply chain with one-single supplier and one-single manufacturer to reduce carbon emission. In this supply chain, carbon abatement investment becomes one of key factors of cutting costs and imp...

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Autores principales: Lang Xu, Chuanxu Wang, Hui Li
Formato: article
Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Nature Portfolio 2017
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/4625cdcbb30b4ed69f09bc1e1206620a
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:4625cdcbb30b4ed69f09bc1e1206620a2021-12-02T12:32:59ZDecision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness10.1038/s41598-017-03270-22045-2322https://doaj.org/article/4625cdcbb30b4ed69f09bc1e1206620a2017-06-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-03270-2https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract We focus on the impacts of technological spillovers and environmental awareness in a two-echelon supply chain with one-single supplier and one-single manufacturer to reduce carbon emission. In this supply chain, carbon abatement investment becomes one of key factors of cutting costs and improving profits, which is reducing production costs in the components and products—the investment from players in supply chain. On the basis of optimality theory, the centralized and decentralized models are respectively established to investigate the optimal decisions and profits. Further, setting the players’ profits of the decentralized scenario as the disagreement points, we propose a bargaining-coordination contract through revenue-cost sharing to enhance the performance. Finally, by theoretical comparison and numerical analysis, the results show that: (i) The optimal profits of players and supply chain improve as technological spillovers and environmental awareness increase, and the profits of them in the bargaining-coordination contract are higher than that in the decentralized scenario; (ii) Technological spillovers between the players amplify the impact of “free-ride” behavior, in which the supplier always incentives the manufacturer to improve carbon emission intensity, but the cooperation will achieves and the profits will improve only when technological spillovers and environmental awareness are great; (iii) The contract can effectively achieve coordinated supply chain, and improve carbon abatement investment.Lang XuChuanxu WangHui LiNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-14 (2017)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Medicine
R
Science
Q
spellingShingle Medicine
R
Science
Q
Lang Xu
Chuanxu Wang
Hui Li
Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness
description Abstract We focus on the impacts of technological spillovers and environmental awareness in a two-echelon supply chain with one-single supplier and one-single manufacturer to reduce carbon emission. In this supply chain, carbon abatement investment becomes one of key factors of cutting costs and improving profits, which is reducing production costs in the components and products—the investment from players in supply chain. On the basis of optimality theory, the centralized and decentralized models are respectively established to investigate the optimal decisions and profits. Further, setting the players’ profits of the decentralized scenario as the disagreement points, we propose a bargaining-coordination contract through revenue-cost sharing to enhance the performance. Finally, by theoretical comparison and numerical analysis, the results show that: (i) The optimal profits of players and supply chain improve as technological spillovers and environmental awareness increase, and the profits of them in the bargaining-coordination contract are higher than that in the decentralized scenario; (ii) Technological spillovers between the players amplify the impact of “free-ride” behavior, in which the supplier always incentives the manufacturer to improve carbon emission intensity, but the cooperation will achieves and the profits will improve only when technological spillovers and environmental awareness are great; (iii) The contract can effectively achieve coordinated supply chain, and improve carbon abatement investment.
format article
author Lang Xu
Chuanxu Wang
Hui Li
author_facet Lang Xu
Chuanxu Wang
Hui Li
author_sort Lang Xu
title Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness
title_short Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness
title_full Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness
title_fullStr Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness
title_full_unstemmed Decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness
title_sort decision and coordination of low-carbon supply chain considering technological spillover and environmental awareness
publisher Nature Portfolio
publishDate 2017
url https://doaj.org/article/4625cdcbb30b4ed69f09bc1e1206620a
work_keys_str_mv AT langxu decisionandcoordinationoflowcarbonsupplychainconsideringtechnologicalspilloverandenvironmentalawareness
AT chuanxuwang decisionandcoordinationoflowcarbonsupplychainconsideringtechnologicalspilloverandenvironmentalawareness
AT huili decisionandcoordinationoflowcarbonsupplychainconsideringtechnologicalspilloverandenvironmentalawareness
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