Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance

Population growth, along with climate change, has exacerbaed the water crisis in local communities. The simplest and quickest response of governments to such problems is direct intervention in local governance. Such solutions are usually proposed without regarding the indigenous knowledge of the loc...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales:	Mohamad M. Kamal, Hadi Amiri, Vahid Moghadam, Dariush Rahimi
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	IWA Publishing 2021
Materias:	collective action government intervention iad framework institutional analysis water governance River, lake, and water-supply engineering (General) TC401-506
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/4857d83c399a4c95b9dfb560a12e788e
Etiquetas:	Agregar Etiqueta Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!

id	oai:doaj.org-article:4857d83c399a4c95b9dfb560a12e788e
record_format	dspace
spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:4857d83c399a4c95b9dfb560a12e788e2021-11-05T20:18:11ZInstitutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance1366-70171996-975910.2166/wp.2021.075https://doaj.org/article/4857d83c399a4c95b9dfb560a12e788e2021-08-01T00:00:00Zhttp://wp.iwaponline.com/content/23/4/930https://doaj.org/toc/1366-7017https://doaj.org/toc/1996-9759Population growth, along with climate change, has exacerbaed the water crisis in local communities. The simplest and quickest response of governments to such problems is direct intervention in local governance. Such solutions are usually proposed without regarding the indigenous knowledge of the local people. These also include top-down policies on water issues, which disrupt local institutional arrangements and eliminate the possibility of collective action by stakeholders in reaching an agreement. A case study of one of the water basins in Chaharmahal Bakhtiari in Iran (the Gorgak River in Sureshjan city) using an institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework shows that in the past, people acted collectively to solve the asymmetric distribution and drought problem. But government intervention, which initially sought to improve water conditions, has disrupted the region's institutional arrangements and power asymmetries between exploiters. Our study used the IAD framework to examine changes in institutional arrangements due to the introduction of technology and government intervention by the game theory. It clarifies that government intervention in local institutional arrangements, even if designed with the intention of improving conditions, may lead to greater inequality due to disregarding physical and social conditions and local knowledge. This inequality can eventually worsen the situation. HIGHLIGHTS Government intervention in local institutional arrangements may lead to greater inequality due to disregarding local knowledge and local institutions.; Using the institutional analysis and development framework and game theory, we identified the effective institutional factors in our case study.; Our study shows the consequences of a wrong government intervention, which crowd out the self-governance of local communities.;Mohamad M. KamalHadi AmiriVahid MoghadamDariush RahimiIWA Publishingarticlecollective actiongovernment interventioniad frameworkinstitutional analysiswater governanceRiver, lake, and water-supply engineering (General)TC401-506ENWater Policy, Vol 23, Iss 4, Pp 930-945 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	collective action government intervention iad framework institutional analysis water governance River, lake, and water-supply engineering (General) TC401-506
spellingShingle	collective action government intervention iad framework institutional analysis water governance River, lake, and water-supply engineering (General) TC401-506 Mohamad M. Kamal Hadi Amiri Vahid Moghadam Dariush Rahimi Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance
description	Population growth, along with climate change, has exacerbaed the water crisis in local communities. The simplest and quickest response of governments to such problems is direct intervention in local governance. Such solutions are usually proposed without regarding the indigenous knowledge of the local people. These also include top-down policies on water issues, which disrupt local institutional arrangements and eliminate the possibility of collective action by stakeholders in reaching an agreement. A case study of one of the water basins in Chaharmahal Bakhtiari in Iran (the Gorgak River in Sureshjan city) using an institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework shows that in the past, people acted collectively to solve the asymmetric distribution and drought problem. But government intervention, which initially sought to improve water conditions, has disrupted the region's institutional arrangements and power asymmetries between exploiters. Our study used the IAD framework to examine changes in institutional arrangements due to the introduction of technology and government intervention by the game theory. It clarifies that government intervention in local institutional arrangements, even if designed with the intention of improving conditions, may lead to greater inequality due to disregarding physical and social conditions and local knowledge. This inequality can eventually worsen the situation. HIGHLIGHTS Government intervention in local institutional arrangements may lead to greater inequality due to disregarding local knowledge and local institutions.; Using the institutional analysis and development framework and game theory, we identified the effective institutional factors in our case study.; Our study shows the consequences of a wrong government intervention, which crowd out the self-governance of local communities.;
format	article
author	Mohamad M. Kamal Hadi Amiri Vahid Moghadam Dariush Rahimi
author_facet	Mohamad M. Kamal Hadi Amiri Vahid Moghadam Dariush Rahimi
author_sort	Mohamad M. Kamal
title	Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance
title_short	Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance
title_full	Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance
title_fullStr	Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance
title_full_unstemmed	Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance
title_sort	institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from iran local governance
publisher	IWA Publishing
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/4857d83c399a4c95b9dfb560a12e788e
work_keys_str_mv	AT mohamadmkamal institutionalanalysisoftopdownregulatoryevidencefromiranlocalgovernance AT hadiamiri institutionalanalysisoftopdownregulatoryevidencefromiranlocalgovernance AT vahidmoghadam institutionalanalysisoftopdownregulatoryevidencefromiranlocalgovernance AT dariushrahimi institutionalanalysisoftopdownregulatoryevidencefromiranlocalgovernance
_version_	1718444035250585600

Institutional analysis of top-down regulatory: evidence from Iran local governance

Ejemplares similares