A game analysis of MNC CSR in China

Weakening multinational corporation (MNC) commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) has caused increasing concern in China. What motivates MNC’s to diminish their commitment to CSR? This paper applies game theory to attempt to answer this important question for the Chinese context. The aim...

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Autores principales:	Ronald J. Salazar, Jifu Wang, Rupak Rauniar, Xiuli Wang
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Taylor & Francis Group 2018
Materias:	multinational corporation subsidiary in china corporate social responsibility game theory Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/4878d1294ec44880bbdeb3d515d65f35
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:4878d1294ec44880bbdeb3d515d65f352021-12-02T10:44:30ZA game analysis of MNC CSR in China2331-197510.1080/23311975.2017.1409685https://doaj.org/article/4878d1294ec44880bbdeb3d515d65f352018-01-01T00:00:00Zhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23311975.2017.1409685https://doaj.org/toc/2331-1975Weakening multinational corporation (MNC) commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) has caused increasing concern in China. What motivates MNC’s to diminish their commitment to CSR? This paper applies game theory to attempt to answer this important question for the Chinese context. The aim of this paper is to characterize the decision choices MNC managers face using game theory and to evaluate whether game theory, based on cost–benefit analysis, can contribute to a better understanding of the tendency to diminish CSR. Public opinion, political legitimacy, competing priorities, stage of market development, short-term orientation, and stakeholder activism each influence manager’s choices. Despite the widespread recognition that CSR is important in business, the costs of CSR implementation are implicitly weighed against the benefits of favorable CSR outcomes. We demonstrate how the weakening observed in China exhibits properties amenable to analysis in a game-theoretic sense rather than dominance and how the trend might be reversed. The findings of this study provide useful insights into the consequences of stakeholder behavior for CSR outcomes. Researchers will find the results helpful in further exploring how specific stakeholder activities influence CSR. Investors, managers, regulators, and stakeholders will find the results expository of some underlying forces influencing managerial decision-making in MNCs.Ronald J. SalazarJifu WangRupak RauniarXiuli WangTaylor & Francis Grouparticlemultinational corporation subsidiary in chinacorporate social responsibilitygame theoryBusinessHF5001-6182Management. Industrial managementHD28-70ENCogent Business & Management, Vol 5, Iss 1 (2018)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	multinational corporation subsidiary in china corporate social responsibility game theory Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70
spellingShingle	multinational corporation subsidiary in china corporate social responsibility game theory Business HF5001-6182 Management. Industrial management HD28-70 Ronald J. Salazar Jifu Wang Rupak Rauniar Xiuli Wang A game analysis of MNC CSR in China
description	Weakening multinational corporation (MNC) commitment to corporate social responsibility (CSR) has caused increasing concern in China. What motivates MNC’s to diminish their commitment to CSR? This paper applies game theory to attempt to answer this important question for the Chinese context. The aim of this paper is to characterize the decision choices MNC managers face using game theory and to evaluate whether game theory, based on cost–benefit analysis, can contribute to a better understanding of the tendency to diminish CSR. Public opinion, political legitimacy, competing priorities, stage of market development, short-term orientation, and stakeholder activism each influence manager’s choices. Despite the widespread recognition that CSR is important in business, the costs of CSR implementation are implicitly weighed against the benefits of favorable CSR outcomes. We demonstrate how the weakening observed in China exhibits properties amenable to analysis in a game-theoretic sense rather than dominance and how the trend might be reversed. The findings of this study provide useful insights into the consequences of stakeholder behavior for CSR outcomes. Researchers will find the results helpful in further exploring how specific stakeholder activities influence CSR. Investors, managers, regulators, and stakeholders will find the results expository of some underlying forces influencing managerial decision-making in MNCs.
format	article
author	Ronald J. Salazar Jifu Wang Rupak Rauniar Xiuli Wang
author_facet	Ronald J. Salazar Jifu Wang Rupak Rauniar Xiuli Wang
author_sort	Ronald J. Salazar
title	A game analysis of MNC CSR in China
title_short	A game analysis of MNC CSR in China
title_full	A game analysis of MNC CSR in China
title_fullStr	A game analysis of MNC CSR in China
title_full_unstemmed	A game analysis of MNC CSR in China
title_sort	game analysis of mnc csr in china
publisher	Taylor & Francis Group
publishDate	2018
url	https://doaj.org/article/4878d1294ec44880bbdeb3d515d65f35
work_keys_str_mv	AT ronaldjsalazar agameanalysisofmnccsrinchina AT jifuwang agameanalysisofmnccsrinchina AT rupakrauniar agameanalysisofmnccsrinchina AT xiuliwang agameanalysisofmnccsrinchina AT ronaldjsalazar gameanalysisofmnccsrinchina AT jifuwang gameanalysisofmnccsrinchina AT rupakrauniar gameanalysisofmnccsrinchina AT xiuliwang gameanalysisofmnccsrinchina
_version_	1718396759888101376

A game analysis of MNC CSR in China

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