How to Distinguish Norms from Values
It is difficult to find decisive criteria by which to distinguish norms from values. In this article I argue that if we assume that norms essentially possess a specific set of properties, and that values do not possess these properties, we can better appreciate the distinction between norms and val...
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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oai:doaj.org-article:4ad2e72c6e0b4126abfca9a8522b13a42021-12-02T10:15:20ZHow to Distinguish Norms from Values10.13128/Phe_Mi-195772280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/4ad2e72c6e0b4126abfca9a8522b13a42016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7136https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 It is difficult to find decisive criteria by which to distinguish norms from values. In this article I argue that if we assume that norms essentially possess a specific set of properties, and that values do not possess these properties, we can better appreciate the distinction between norms and values and explain the plausibility of other traditional criteria of distinction. The relevant properties are that norms are directed to some addressees, possess conditions of satisfaction and are supposed to guide and motivate their addressees to satisfy these conditions. Davide FassioRosenberg & SellierarticlenormsvaluesAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 5 (2016) |
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norms values Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 |
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norms values Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Davide Fassio How to Distinguish Norms from Values |
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It is difficult to find decisive criteria by which to distinguish norms from values. In this article I argue that if we assume that norms essentially possess a specific set of properties, and that values do not possess these properties, we can better appreciate the distinction between norms and values and explain the plausibility of other traditional criteria of distinction. The relevant properties are that norms are directed to some addressees, possess conditions of satisfaction and are supposed to guide and motivate their addressees to satisfy these conditions.
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format |
article |
author |
Davide Fassio |
author_facet |
Davide Fassio |
author_sort |
Davide Fassio |
title |
How to Distinguish Norms from Values |
title_short |
How to Distinguish Norms from Values |
title_full |
How to Distinguish Norms from Values |
title_fullStr |
How to Distinguish Norms from Values |
title_full_unstemmed |
How to Distinguish Norms from Values |
title_sort |
how to distinguish norms from values |
publisher |
Rosenberg & Sellier |
publishDate |
2016 |
url |
https://doaj.org/article/4ad2e72c6e0b4126abfca9a8522b13a4 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT davidefassio howtodistinguishnormsfromvalues |
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1718397459547291648 |