Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations

Abstract The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be par...

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Autores principales:	Attila Szolnoki, Xiaojie Chen
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/4c11a0abd2c24916a7f81eab1c05657c
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:4c11a0abd2c24916a7f81eab1c05657c2021-12-02T17:47:03ZCooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations10.1038/s41598-021-91532-52045-2322https://doaj.org/article/4c11a0abd2c24916a7f81eab1c05657c2021-06-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-91532-5https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.Attila SzolnokiXiaojie ChenNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 11, Iss 1, Pp 1-9 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Attila Szolnoki Xiaojie Chen Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
description	Abstract The conflict between individual and collective interests is in the heart of every social dilemmas established by evolutionary game theory. We cannot avoid these conflicts but sometimes we may choose which interaction framework to use as a battlefield. For instance some people like to be part of a larger group while other persons prefer to interact in a more personalized, individual way. Both attitudes can be formulated via appropriately chosen traditional games. In particular, the prisoner’s dilemma game is based on pair interaction while the public goods game represents multi-point interactions of group members. To reveal the possible advantage of a certain attitude we extend these models by allowing players not simply to change their strategies but also let them to vary their attitudes for a higher individual income. We show that both attitudes could be the winner at a specific parameter value. Interestingly, however, the subtle interplay between different states may result in a counterintuitive evolutionary outcome where the increase of the multiplication factor of public goods game drives the population to a fully defector state. We point out that the accompanying pattern formation can only be understood via the multipoint or multi-player interactions of different microscopic states where the vicinity of a particular state may influence the relation of two other competitors.
format	article
author	Attila Szolnoki Xiaojie Chen
author_facet	Attila Szolnoki Xiaojie Chen
author_sort	Attila Szolnoki
title	Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
title_short	Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
title_full	Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
title_fullStr	Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
title_full_unstemmed	Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
title_sort	cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/4c11a0abd2c24916a7f81eab1c05657c
work_keys_str_mv	AT attilaszolnoki cooperationandcompetitionbetweenpairandmultiplayersocialgamesinspatialpopulations AT xiaojiechen cooperationandcompetitionbetweenpairandmultiplayersocialgamesinspatialpopulations
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Cooperation and competition between pair and multi-player social games in spatial populations

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