Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction pa...

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Autores principales:	Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Guangming Xie, Long Wang, Matjaž Perc
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2011
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/4cac0db58c7f489cb19f9613efce4415
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:4cac0db58c7f489cb19f9613efce44152021-11-18T07:35:23ZEvolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0026724https://doaj.org/article/4cac0db58c7f489cb19f9613efce44152011-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/22066006/?tool=EBIhttps://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.Chunyan ZhangJianlei ZhangGuangming XieLong WangMatjaž PercPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 6, Iss 10, p e26724 (2011)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Chunyan Zhang Jianlei Zhang Guangming Xie Long Wang Matjaž Perc Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
description	We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game where players are allowed to establish new interactions with others. By employing a simple coevolutionary rule entailing only two crucial parameters, we find that different selection criteria for the new interaction partners as well as their number vitally affect the outcome of the game. The resolution of the social dilemma is most probable if the selection favors more successful players and if their maximally attainable number is restricted. While the preferential selection of the best players promotes cooperation irrespective of game parametrization, the optimal number of new interactions depends somewhat on the temptation to defect. Our findings reveal that the "making of new friends" may be an important activity for the successful evolution of cooperation, but also that partners must be selected carefully and their number limited.
format	article
author	Chunyan Zhang Jianlei Zhang Guangming Xie Long Wang Matjaž Perc
author_facet	Chunyan Zhang Jianlei Zhang Guangming Xie Long Wang Matjaž Perc
author_sort	Chunyan Zhang
title	Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
title_short	Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
title_full	Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
title_fullStr	Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
title_full_unstemmed	Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
title_sort	evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2011
url	https://doaj.org/article/4cac0db58c7f489cb19f9613efce4415
work_keys_str_mv	AT chunyanzhang evolutionofinteractionsandcooperationinthespatialprisonersdilemmagame AT jianleizhang evolutionofinteractionsandcooperationinthespatialprisonersdilemmagame AT guangmingxie evolutionofinteractionsandcooperationinthespatialprisonersdilemmagame AT longwang evolutionofinteractionsandcooperationinthespatialprisonersdilemmagame AT matjazperc evolutionofinteractionsandcooperationinthespatialprisonersdilemmagame
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Evolution of interactions and cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game.

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