Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran

Cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has led to environmental benefits in some groundwater markets by restricting and economically reallocating water permits. However, top-down approaches for capping permits may face resistance from every affected stakeholder. This paper presents an efficient policy frame...

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Autores principales:	Mohammad Amin Zolfagharipoor, Azadeh Ahmadi, Alireza Nikouei
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	IWA Publishing 2021
Materias:	bargaining bottom-up capping (buc) policy fair reallocation water trading River, lake, and water-supply engineering (General) TC401-506
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/4ec8d646afc044d8a5b551992e0b2df6
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:4ec8d646afc044d8a5b551992e0b2df62021-11-05T20:18:10ZBottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran1366-70171996-975910.2166/wp.2021.251https://doaj.org/article/4ec8d646afc044d8a5b551992e0b2df62021-08-01T00:00:00Zhttp://wp.iwaponline.com/content/23/4/912https://doaj.org/toc/1366-7017https://doaj.org/toc/1996-9759Cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has led to environmental benefits in some groundwater markets by restricting and economically reallocating water permits. However, top-down approaches for capping permits may face resistance from every affected stakeholder. This paper presents an efficient policy framework to improve the implementation of C&T policies in a real shared aquifer in Iran. To this end, groundwater permits for water-selling farms are capped through a bottom-up capping (BUC) policy. A policy analysis that employs static and dynamic bargaining techniques incorporates farms' utilities. Results reveal that the bargaining techniques propose more acceptable capping strategies than the top-down approach. The BUC policy analysis introduces the proposed strategy by dynamic bargaining as the tradable groundwater permits. The effects of irrigation water sales to the industry sector, evaluated using a cooperative game-based optimization model, show that with the fair reallocation of water trading benefits, the current net benefits of agriculture and industry sectors increase by 55 and 27%, respectively. Furthermore, farms reduce their groundwater withdrawals by 35% compared with the current mode. Therefore, the BUC policy for inter-sectoral groundwater trading under dynamic bargaining can lead to the sustainable use of limited groundwater resources by facilitating the capping strategies and improving the water permits productivity. HIGHLIGHTS Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques is presented to facilitate cap-and-trade policies in groundwater markets.; Policy analysis reveals that proposed capping strategies by the bottom-up approach are more acceptable than the command-and-control approach.; A cooperative game-based optimization model fairly reallocates water trading benefits among market participants.;Mohammad Amin ZolfagharipoorAzadeh AhmadiAlireza NikoueiIWA Publishingarticlebargainingbottom-up capping (buc) policyfair reallocationwater tradingRiver, lake, and water-supply engineering (General)TC401-506ENWater Policy, Vol 23, Iss 4, Pp 912-929 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	bargaining bottom-up capping (buc) policy fair reallocation water trading River, lake, and water-supply engineering (General) TC401-506
spellingShingle	bargaining bottom-up capping (buc) policy fair reallocation water trading River, lake, and water-supply engineering (General) TC401-506 Mohammad Amin Zolfagharipoor Azadeh Ahmadi Alireza Nikouei Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran
description	Cap-and-trade (C&T) policy has led to environmental benefits in some groundwater markets by restricting and economically reallocating water permits. However, top-down approaches for capping permits may face resistance from every affected stakeholder. This paper presents an efficient policy framework to improve the implementation of C&T policies in a real shared aquifer in Iran. To this end, groundwater permits for water-selling farms are capped through a bottom-up capping (BUC) policy. A policy analysis that employs static and dynamic bargaining techniques incorporates farms' utilities. Results reveal that the bargaining techniques propose more acceptable capping strategies than the top-down approach. The BUC policy analysis introduces the proposed strategy by dynamic bargaining as the tradable groundwater permits. The effects of irrigation water sales to the industry sector, evaluated using a cooperative game-based optimization model, show that with the fair reallocation of water trading benefits, the current net benefits of agriculture and industry sectors increase by 55 and 27%, respectively. Furthermore, farms reduce their groundwater withdrawals by 35% compared with the current mode. Therefore, the BUC policy for inter-sectoral groundwater trading under dynamic bargaining can lead to the sustainable use of limited groundwater resources by facilitating the capping strategies and improving the water permits productivity. HIGHLIGHTS Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques is presented to facilitate cap-and-trade policies in groundwater markets.; Policy analysis reveals that proposed capping strategies by the bottom-up approach are more acceptable than the command-and-control approach.; A cooperative game-based optimization model fairly reallocates water trading benefits among market participants.;
format	article
author	Mohammad Amin Zolfagharipoor Azadeh Ahmadi Alireza Nikouei
author_facet	Mohammad Amin Zolfagharipoor Azadeh Ahmadi Alireza Nikouei
author_sort	Mohammad Amin Zolfagharipoor
title	Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran
title_short	Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran
title_full	Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran
title_fullStr	Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran
title_full_unstemmed	Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran
title_sort	bottom-up capping (buc) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from iran
publisher	IWA Publishing
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/4ec8d646afc044d8a5b551992e0b2df6
work_keys_str_mv	AT mohammadaminzolfagharipoor bottomupcappingbucpolicyunderbargainingtechniquesforintersectoralgroundwatertradingacasestudyfromiran AT azadehahmadi bottomupcappingbucpolicyunderbargainingtechniquesforintersectoralgroundwatertradingacasestudyfromiran AT alirezanikouei bottomupcappingbucpolicyunderbargainingtechniquesforintersectoralgroundwatertradingacasestudyfromiran
_version_	1718444037355077632

Bottom-up capping (BUC) policy under bargaining techniques for inter-sectoral groundwater trading: a case study from Iran

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