Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.

Deterrence, a defender's avoidance of a challenger's attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats...

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Autores principales:	Ulrich Berger, Hannelore De Silva
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Public Library of Science (PLoS) 2021
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/4edb7f6af19a4d59be653e9019af4f28
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:4edb7f6af19a4d59be653e9019af4f282021-12-02T20:10:37ZEvolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.1932-620310.1371/journal.pone.0253344https://doaj.org/article/4edb7f6af19a4d59be653e9019af4f282021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0253344https://doaj.org/toc/1932-6203Deterrence, a defender's avoidance of a challenger's attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obtaining information on reputation. Even for small information costs successful deterrence is never evolutionarily stable. Here we use game-theoretic modelling and agent-based simulations to resolve this puzzle and to clarify under which conditions deterrence can nevertheless evolve and when it is bound to fail. Paradoxically, rich information on defenders' past actions leads to a breakdown of deterrence, while with only minimal information deterrence can be highly successful. We argue that reputation-based deterrence sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights.Ulrich BergerHannelore De SilvaPublic Library of Science (PLoS)articleMedicineRScienceQENPLoS ONE, Vol 16, Iss 6, p e0253344 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Ulrich Berger Hannelore De Silva Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.
description	Deterrence, a defender's avoidance of a challenger's attack based on the threat of retaliation, is a basic ingredient of social cooperation in several animal species and is ubiquitous in human societies. Deterrence theory has recognized that deterrence can only be based on credible threats, but retaliating being costly for the defender rules this out in one-shot interactions. If interactions are repeated and observable, reputation building has been suggested as a way to sustain credibility and enable the evolution of deterrence. But this explanation ignores both the source and the costs of obtaining information on reputation. Even for small information costs successful deterrence is never evolutionarily stable. Here we use game-theoretic modelling and agent-based simulations to resolve this puzzle and to clarify under which conditions deterrence can nevertheless evolve and when it is bound to fail. Paradoxically, rich information on defenders' past actions leads to a breakdown of deterrence, while with only minimal information deterrence can be highly successful. We argue that reputation-based deterrence sheds light on phenomena such as costly punishment and fairness, and might serve as a possible explanation for the evolution of informal property rights.
format	article
author	Ulrich Berger Hannelore De Silva
author_facet	Ulrich Berger Hannelore De Silva
author_sort	Ulrich Berger
title	Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.
title_short	Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.
title_full	Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.
title_fullStr	Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.
title_full_unstemmed	Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.
title_sort	evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.
publisher	Public Library of Science (PLoS)
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/4edb7f6af19a4d59be653e9019af4f28
work_keys_str_mv	AT ulrichberger evolutionofdeterrencewithcostlyreputationinformation AT hanneloredesilva evolutionofdeterrencewithcostlyreputationinformation
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Evolution of deterrence with costly reputation information.

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