Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19

Diagnostic testing can be used for many purposes, including testing to facilitate the clinical care of individual patients, testing as an inclusion criterion for clinical trial participation, and both passive and active surveillance testing of the general population in order to facilitate public hea...

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Autores principales:	Ashley Graham Kennedy, Bryan Cwik
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences 2021
Materias:	diagnostic justice philosophy of medicine political philosophy applied ethics Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/4efc4e4a9e4a40f1a752fce8ea4f17e7
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:4efc4e4a9e4a40f1a752fce8ea4f17e72021-11-25T06:44:51ZDiagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-191845-84751849-0514https://doaj.org/article/4efc4e4a9e4a40f1a752fce8ea4f17e72021-01-01T00:00:00Zhttps://hrcak.srce.hr/file/385896https://doaj.org/toc/1845-8475https://doaj.org/toc/1849-0514Diagnostic testing can be used for many purposes, including testing to facilitate the clinical care of individual patients, testing as an inclusion criterion for clinical trial participation, and both passive and active surveillance testing of the general population in order to facilitate public health outcomes, such as the containment or mitigation of an infectious disease. As such, diagnostic testing presents us with ethical questions that are, in part, already addressed in the literature on clinical care as well as clinical research (such as the rights of patients to refuse testing or treatment in the clinical setting or the rights of participants in randomized controlled trials to withdraw from the trial at any time). However, diagnostic testing, for the purpose of disease surveillance also raises ethical issues that we do not encounter in these settings, and thus have not been much discussed. In this paper we will be concerned with the similarities and differences between the ethical considerations in these three domains: clinical care, clinical research, and public health, as they relate to diagnostic testing specifically. Via an examination of the COVID-19 case we will show how an appeal to the concept of diagnostic justice helps us to make sense of the (at times competing) ethical considerations in these three domains.Ashley Graham KennedyBryan CwikUniversity of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences articlediagnostic justicephilosophy of medicinepolitical philosophyapplied ethicsPhilosophy (General)B1-5802ENEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy, Vol 17, Iss 2, Pp S2-25 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	diagnostic justice philosophy of medicine political philosophy applied ethics Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	diagnostic justice philosophy of medicine political philosophy applied ethics Philosophy (General) B1-5802 Ashley Graham Kennedy Bryan Cwik Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19
description	Diagnostic testing can be used for many purposes, including testing to facilitate the clinical care of individual patients, testing as an inclusion criterion for clinical trial participation, and both passive and active surveillance testing of the general population in order to facilitate public health outcomes, such as the containment or mitigation of an infectious disease. As such, diagnostic testing presents us with ethical questions that are, in part, already addressed in the literature on clinical care as well as clinical research (such as the rights of patients to refuse testing or treatment in the clinical setting or the rights of participants in randomized controlled trials to withdraw from the trial at any time). However, diagnostic testing, for the purpose of disease surveillance also raises ethical issues that we do not encounter in these settings, and thus have not been much discussed. In this paper we will be concerned with the similarities and differences between the ethical considerations in these three domains: clinical care, clinical research, and public health, as they relate to diagnostic testing specifically. Via an examination of the COVID-19 case we will show how an appeal to the concept of diagnostic justice helps us to make sense of the (at times competing) ethical considerations in these three domains.
format	article
author	Ashley Graham Kennedy Bryan Cwik
author_facet	Ashley Graham Kennedy Bryan Cwik
author_sort	Ashley Graham Kennedy
title	Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19
title_short	Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19
title_full	Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19
title_fullStr	Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19
title_full_unstemmed	Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19
title_sort	diagnostic justice: testing for covid-19
publisher	University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/4efc4e4a9e4a40f1a752fce8ea4f17e7
work_keys_str_mv	AT ashleygrahamkennedy diagnosticjusticetestingforcovid19 AT bryancwik diagnosticjusticetestingforcovid19
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Diagnostic Justice: Testing for Covid-19

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