Determining the Common Good: A (Re-)Constructive Critique of the Proceduralist Paradigm
In recent years, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists have witnessed a renaissance of the concept of the common good in political discourse: political agents such as parties, civic networks and courts increasingly refer to this concept to justify their actions. This development gives...
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
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Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/4f071ee40808418f95b316385c5146ee |
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| Sumario: | In recent years, philosophers, political scientists and sociologists have witnessed a renaissance of the concept of the common good in political discourse: political agents such as parties, civic networks and courts increasingly refer to this concept to justify their actions. This development gives rise to the question whether normative political theory can provide a sensible definition of the common good which is compatible with pluralistic democratic society and which allows the identification of a specific range of well justified policies. The most influential account in this field is the theory of proceduralism which holds that the common good consists, by necessity, in the output of a political system whose procedures grant each citizen an equal say in collective decision-making. This account derives its initial plausibility from acknowledging citizens as agents who autonomously shape the welfare of their community on the basis of their subjective interests. However, it falls short of explaining how democratic decision-making good could possibly authorize actions that are detrimental to the common good. This problem is solved by a modification of the proceduralist paradigm that complements procedural criteria with objective and substantive standards that serve as limiting values for admissible policy outputs.
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