Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness
Social interactions among people are often repeated, and yet it is assumed that simultaneous interactions are independent from one another. Here, Reiter and colleagues describe a conceptual framework where an action in one game can influence the decision in another.
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
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| Formato: | article |
| Lenguaje: | EN |
| Publicado: |
Nature Portfolio
2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/518c3894b3ba486192f2c960aae8227e |
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| Sumario: | Social interactions among people are often repeated, and yet it is assumed that simultaneous interactions are independent from one another. Here, Reiter and colleagues describe a conceptual framework where an action in one game can influence the decision in another. |
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