Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks

Abstract Recent empirical work highlights the heterogeneity of social competitions such as political campaigns: proponents of some ideologies seek debate and conversation, others create echo chambers. While symmetric and static network structure is typically used as a substrate to study such competi...

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Autores principales:	Laurent Hébert-Dufresne, Antoine Allard, Pierre-André Noël, Jean-Gabriel Young, Eric Libby
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2017
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/52652d409b72445886a2daf96de41d7d
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:52652d409b72445886a2daf96de41d7d2021-12-02T11:40:58ZStrategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks10.1038/s41598-017-07621-x2045-2322https://doaj.org/article/52652d409b72445886a2daf96de41d7d2017-08-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-07621-xhttps://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Recent empirical work highlights the heterogeneity of social competitions such as political campaigns: proponents of some ideologies seek debate and conversation, others create echo chambers. While symmetric and static network structure is typically used as a substrate to study such competitor dynamics, network structure can instead be interpreted as a signature of the competitor strategies, yielding competition dynamics on adaptive networks. Here we demonstrate that tradeoffs between aggressiveness and defensiveness (i.e., targeting adversaries vs. targeting like-minded individuals) creates paradoxical behaviour such as non-transitive dynamics. And while there is an optimal strategy in a two competitor system, three competitor systems have no such solution; the introduction of extreme strategies can easily affect the outcome of a competition, even if the extreme strategies have no chance of winning. Not only are these results reminiscent of classic paradoxical results from evolutionary game theory, but the structure of social networks created by our model can be mapped to particular forms of payoff matrices. Consequently, social structure can act as a measurable metric for social games which in turn allows us to provide a game theoretical perspective on online political debates.Laurent Hébert-DufresneAntoine AllardPierre-André NoëlJean-Gabriel YoungEric LibbyNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 7, Iss 1, Pp 1-11 (2017)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Laurent Hébert-Dufresne Antoine Allard Pierre-André Noël Jean-Gabriel Young Eric Libby Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks
description	Abstract Recent empirical work highlights the heterogeneity of social competitions such as political campaigns: proponents of some ideologies seek debate and conversation, others create echo chambers. While symmetric and static network structure is typically used as a substrate to study such competitor dynamics, network structure can instead be interpreted as a signature of the competitor strategies, yielding competition dynamics on adaptive networks. Here we demonstrate that tradeoffs between aggressiveness and defensiveness (i.e., targeting adversaries vs. targeting like-minded individuals) creates paradoxical behaviour such as non-transitive dynamics. And while there is an optimal strategy in a two competitor system, three competitor systems have no such solution; the introduction of extreme strategies can easily affect the outcome of a competition, even if the extreme strategies have no chance of winning. Not only are these results reminiscent of classic paradoxical results from evolutionary game theory, but the structure of social networks created by our model can be mapped to particular forms of payoff matrices. Consequently, social structure can act as a measurable metric for social games which in turn allows us to provide a game theoretical perspective on online political debates.
format	article
author	Laurent Hébert-Dufresne Antoine Allard Pierre-André Noël Jean-Gabriel Young Eric Libby
author_facet	Laurent Hébert-Dufresne Antoine Allard Pierre-André Noël Jean-Gabriel Young Eric Libby
author_sort	Laurent Hébert-Dufresne
title	Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks
title_short	Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks
title_full	Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks
title_fullStr	Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks
title_full_unstemmed	Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks
title_sort	strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2017
url	https://doaj.org/article/52652d409b72445886a2daf96de41d7d
work_keys_str_mv	AT laurenthebertdufresne strategictradeoffsincompetitordynamicsonadaptivenetworks AT antoineallard strategictradeoffsincompetitordynamicsonadaptivenetworks AT pierreandrenoel strategictradeoffsincompetitordynamicsonadaptivenetworks AT jeangabrielyoung strategictradeoffsincompetitordynamicsonadaptivenetworks AT ericlibby strategictradeoffsincompetitordynamicsonadaptivenetworks
_version_	1718395515857534976

Strategic tradeoffs in competitor dynamics on adaptive networks

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