Scientific Value Relativism

Abstract Relativism stresses that value judgements are statements about meaning and not about facts, about “ought” and not about “is”. Professor Arnold Brecht explained and substantiated the existence of a link between “is” and “ought”, which does not have a logical character, but does indeed have a...

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Autor principal: Isabel Ruiz-Gallardón
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Springer Nature 2021
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Acceso en línea:https://doaj.org/article/52955376642646c3939d4ff77edecf3c
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:52955376642646c3939d4ff77edecf3c2021-11-28T12:25:48ZScientific Value Relativism10.1057/s41599-021-00973-w2662-9992https://doaj.org/article/52955376642646c3939d4ff77edecf3c2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-021-00973-whttps://doaj.org/toc/2662-9992Abstract Relativism stresses that value judgements are statements about meaning and not about facts, about “ought” and not about “is”. Professor Arnold Brecht explained and substantiated the existence of a link between “is” and “ought”, which does not have a logical character, but does indeed have a “factual” one; a link that, being so evident and intersubjectively transmissible, makes doctrine based on logical separation less important. Suffice it to observe this factual link in a sufficient number of individual cases to arrive inductively at the conclusion of its universal presence with the same certainty or uncertainty as any other inductive conclusion. This paper studies the considerations made by Brecht in the first half of the twentieth century on universal elements that do not derive from arbitrary decisions on justice, but can stem from the necessary feelings inherent to human beings. Confirming this is within the bounds of scientific research. And if these elements are considered as a whole and combined with the two methods proposed by the relativists—clarifying the meaning of the proposed interpretations and analysing their implications—the demonstrable elements obtained are of considerable worth.Isabel Ruiz-GallardónSpringer NaturearticleHistory of scholarship and learning. The humanitiesAZ20-999Social SciencesHENHumanities & Social Sciences Communications, Vol 8, Iss 1, Pp 1-6 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic History of scholarship and learning. The humanities
AZ20-999
Social Sciences
H
spellingShingle History of scholarship and learning. The humanities
AZ20-999
Social Sciences
H
Isabel Ruiz-Gallardón
Scientific Value Relativism
description Abstract Relativism stresses that value judgements are statements about meaning and not about facts, about “ought” and not about “is”. Professor Arnold Brecht explained and substantiated the existence of a link between “is” and “ought”, which does not have a logical character, but does indeed have a “factual” one; a link that, being so evident and intersubjectively transmissible, makes doctrine based on logical separation less important. Suffice it to observe this factual link in a sufficient number of individual cases to arrive inductively at the conclusion of its universal presence with the same certainty or uncertainty as any other inductive conclusion. This paper studies the considerations made by Brecht in the first half of the twentieth century on universal elements that do not derive from arbitrary decisions on justice, but can stem from the necessary feelings inherent to human beings. Confirming this is within the bounds of scientific research. And if these elements are considered as a whole and combined with the two methods proposed by the relativists—clarifying the meaning of the proposed interpretations and analysing their implications—the demonstrable elements obtained are of considerable worth.
format article
author Isabel Ruiz-Gallardón
author_facet Isabel Ruiz-Gallardón
author_sort Isabel Ruiz-Gallardón
title Scientific Value Relativism
title_short Scientific Value Relativism
title_full Scientific Value Relativism
title_fullStr Scientific Value Relativism
title_full_unstemmed Scientific Value Relativism
title_sort scientific value relativism
publisher Springer Nature
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/52955376642646c3939d4ff77edecf3c
work_keys_str_mv AT isabelruizgallardon scientificvaluerelativism
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