Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral

In recent years, China has been promoting the process of carbon neutral by establishing carbon exchanges (CEs) and implementing relevant carbon emission reward and punishment policies. This study proposes a partnership of the CE, solar power plant (SPP) and coal-fired thermal power plant (TPP). Base...

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Autores principales: Gang Wang, Yuechao Chao, Jianqing Lin, Zeshao Chen
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Lenguaje:EN
Publicado: Elsevier 2021
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spelling oai:doaj.org-article:529c3d94ef1741179eed3d7cc0642a982021-11-24T04:32:15ZEvolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral2352-484710.1016/j.egyr.2021.11.057https://doaj.org/article/529c3d94ef1741179eed3d7cc0642a982021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484721012026https://doaj.org/toc/2352-4847In recent years, China has been promoting the process of carbon neutral by establishing carbon exchanges (CEs) and implementing relevant carbon emission reward and punishment policies. This study proposes a partnership of the CE, solar power plant (SPP) and coal-fired thermal power plant (TPP). Based on the tripartite evolutionary game model and current policies of China, the evolutionary processes are simulated and discussed. The results reveal that stable states can be achieved under different partnership modes. Effect evaluation results of typical parameters on the three participants show that on the premise of ensuring the participations of CE and SPP, properly reducing the prices of carbon emission share sold to the TPP will strengthen the participation willingness of TPP. The relatively reasonable selling price ranges of carbon emission share of the CE and SPP sold to the TPP are 6.0∼6.2 $/t and 5.3∼5.5 $/t, respectively. Higher zero carbon emission reward and higher carbon tax can strengthen the participation willingness of TPP and make the TPP achieve the carbon neutral. This study can provide a reference for the government and related industries to promote the carbon neutral development as well as the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power.Gang WangYuechao ChaoJianqing LinZeshao ChenElsevierarticleSolar power plantCoal-fired thermal power plantCarbon emission reductionCarbon neutralCarbon tradingElectrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineeringTK1-9971ENEnergy Reports, Vol 7, Iss , Pp 7716-7727 (2021)
institution DOAJ
collection DOAJ
language EN
topic Solar power plant
Coal-fired thermal power plant
Carbon emission reduction
Carbon neutral
Carbon trading
Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
TK1-9971
spellingShingle Solar power plant
Coal-fired thermal power plant
Carbon emission reduction
Carbon neutral
Carbon trading
Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering
TK1-9971
Gang Wang
Yuechao Chao
Jianqing Lin
Zeshao Chen
Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral
description In recent years, China has been promoting the process of carbon neutral by establishing carbon exchanges (CEs) and implementing relevant carbon emission reward and punishment policies. This study proposes a partnership of the CE, solar power plant (SPP) and coal-fired thermal power plant (TPP). Based on the tripartite evolutionary game model and current policies of China, the evolutionary processes are simulated and discussed. The results reveal that stable states can be achieved under different partnership modes. Effect evaluation results of typical parameters on the three participants show that on the premise of ensuring the participations of CE and SPP, properly reducing the prices of carbon emission share sold to the TPP will strengthen the participation willingness of TPP. The relatively reasonable selling price ranges of carbon emission share of the CE and SPP sold to the TPP are 6.0∼6.2 $/t and 5.3∼5.5 $/t, respectively. Higher zero carbon emission reward and higher carbon tax can strengthen the participation willingness of TPP and make the TPP achieve the carbon neutral. This study can provide a reference for the government and related industries to promote the carbon neutral development as well as the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power.
format article
author Gang Wang
Yuechao Chao
Jianqing Lin
Zeshao Chen
author_facet Gang Wang
Yuechao Chao
Jianqing Lin
Zeshao Chen
author_sort Gang Wang
title Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral
title_short Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral
title_full Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral
title_fullStr Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral
title_full_unstemmed Evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral
title_sort evolutionary game theoretic study on the coordinated development of solar power and coal-fired thermal power under the background of carbon neutral
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2021
url https://doaj.org/article/529c3d94ef1741179eed3d7cc0642a98
work_keys_str_mv AT gangwang evolutionarygametheoreticstudyonthecoordinateddevelopmentofsolarpowerandcoalfiredthermalpowerunderthebackgroundofcarbonneutral
AT yuechaochao evolutionarygametheoreticstudyonthecoordinateddevelopmentofsolarpowerandcoalfiredthermalpowerunderthebackgroundofcarbonneutral
AT jianqinglin evolutionarygametheoreticstudyonthecoordinateddevelopmentofsolarpowerandcoalfiredthermalpowerunderthebackgroundofcarbonneutral
AT zeshaochen evolutionarygametheoreticstudyonthecoordinateddevelopmentofsolarpowerandcoalfiredthermalpowerunderthebackgroundofcarbonneutral
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