Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

In this paper, we study the green credit financing equilibrium in a green supply chain (GSC) with government subsidy and supply uncertainty. The GSC system is composed of one manufacturer, two retailers, one bank, and the government. The manufacturer is subject to both supply uncertainty and limited...

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Autores principales:	Junjian Wu, Jennifer Shang
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	MDPI AG 2021
Materias:	green supply chain green credit financing Cournot competition horizontal cooperation supply uncertainty government subsidy Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/52c2c2186a2148759e69a76c72646295
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:52c2c2186a2148759e69a76c726462952021-11-25T19:05:28ZGreen Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty10.3390/su1322129172071-1050https://doaj.org/article/52c2c2186a2148759e69a76c726462952021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/22/12917https://doaj.org/toc/2071-1050In this paper, we study the green credit financing equilibrium in a green supply chain (GSC) with government subsidy and supply uncertainty. The GSC system is composed of one manufacturer, two retailers, one bank, and the government. The manufacturer is subject to both supply uncertainty and limited capital. The manufacturer invests in the R&D of green products and borrows loans from the bank. The government subsidizes banks to encourage banks to provide loans to manufacturers with lower interest rates, which is termed “green credit financing”. The two retailers decide their order quantities with horizontal competition or horizontal cooperation. We first developed a Stackelberg model to investigate the green credit financing equilibriums (i.e., the interest rate of the bank, the manufacturer’s product green degree and wholesale price, and the retailers’ order quantity) under horizontal competition and horizontal cooperation, respectively. Subsequently, we analyzed how the subsidy interest rate, supply uncertainty, and supply correlation affect financing decisions regarding equilibrium green credit. We found that a high subsidy interest rate leads to a low interest rate of bank and the manufacturer can set a high level of green product and high wholesale price, while the retailers can set a high order quantity. Finally, we compared the green credit financing equilibriums under horizontal competition with those under horizontal cooperation using numerical and analytical methods. We found that, in general, the optimal decisions and profits of bank and SC members, consumer surplus, and social welfare under horizontal competition are higher than those under horizontal cooperation. The findings in this research could provide valuable insights for the management of capital-constrained GSCs with government subsidies and supply uncertainty in a competing market.Junjian WuJennifer ShangMDPI AGarticlegreen supply chaingreen credit financingCournot competitionhorizontal cooperationsupply uncertaintygovernment subsidyEnvironmental effects of industries and plantsTD194-195Renewable energy sourcesTJ807-830Environmental sciencesGE1-350ENSustainability, Vol 13, Iss 12917, p 12917 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	green supply chain green credit financing Cournot competition horizontal cooperation supply uncertainty government subsidy Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350
spellingShingle	green supply chain green credit financing Cournot competition horizontal cooperation supply uncertainty government subsidy Environmental effects of industries and plants TD194-195 Renewable energy sources TJ807-830 Environmental sciences GE1-350 Junjian Wu Jennifer Shang Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty
description	In this paper, we study the green credit financing equilibrium in a green supply chain (GSC) with government subsidy and supply uncertainty. The GSC system is composed of one manufacturer, two retailers, one bank, and the government. The manufacturer is subject to both supply uncertainty and limited capital. The manufacturer invests in the R&D of green products and borrows loans from the bank. The government subsidizes banks to encourage banks to provide loans to manufacturers with lower interest rates, which is termed “green credit financing”. The two retailers decide their order quantities with horizontal competition or horizontal cooperation. We first developed a Stackelberg model to investigate the green credit financing equilibriums (i.e., the interest rate of the bank, the manufacturer’s product green degree and wholesale price, and the retailers’ order quantity) under horizontal competition and horizontal cooperation, respectively. Subsequently, we analyzed how the subsidy interest rate, supply uncertainty, and supply correlation affect financing decisions regarding equilibrium green credit. We found that a high subsidy interest rate leads to a low interest rate of bank and the manufacturer can set a high level of green product and high wholesale price, while the retailers can set a high order quantity. Finally, we compared the green credit financing equilibriums under horizontal competition with those under horizontal cooperation using numerical and analytical methods. We found that, in general, the optimal decisions and profits of bank and SC members, consumer surplus, and social welfare under horizontal competition are higher than those under horizontal cooperation. The findings in this research could provide valuable insights for the management of capital-constrained GSCs with government subsidies and supply uncertainty in a competing market.
format	article
author	Junjian Wu Jennifer Shang
author_facet	Junjian Wu Jennifer Shang
author_sort	Junjian Wu
title	Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty
title_short	Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty
title_full	Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty
title_fullStr	Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed	Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty
title_sort	green credit financing equilibrium under government subsidy and supply uncertainty
publisher	MDPI AG
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/52c2c2186a2148759e69a76c72646295
work_keys_str_mv	AT junjianwu greencreditfinancingequilibriumundergovernmentsubsidyandsupplyuncertainty AT jennifershang greencreditfinancingequilibriumundergovernmentsubsidyandsupplyuncertainty
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Green Credit Financing Equilibrium under Government Subsidy and Supply Uncertainty

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