Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game

Abstract Human adults use a range of social cues to obtain information about potential partners in cooperative contexts: we prefer partners who are competent, wealthy and generous, and those who abide by moral and social rules. One factor that carries particular weight is whether a prospective partn...

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Autores principales:	Laurent Prétôt, Gorana Gonzalez, Katherine McAuliffe
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2020
Materias:	Medicine R Science Q
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/54963fb8808c40b69dfa9eb1071708a7
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:54963fb8808c40b69dfa9eb1071708a72021-12-02T18:18:50ZChildren avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game10.1038/s41598-020-65452-92045-2322https://doaj.org/article/54963fb8808c40b69dfa9eb1071708a72020-06-01T00:00:00Zhttps://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-020-65452-9https://doaj.org/toc/2045-2322Abstract Human adults use a range of social cues to obtain information about potential partners in cooperative contexts: we prefer partners who are competent, wealthy and generous, and those who abide by moral and social rules. One factor that carries particular weight is whether a prospective partner is fair. Here we ask whether children share this preference for fair partners and, if so, whether a prospective partner’s past fair behaviour influences children’s behaviour in a cooperative dilemma. Six- to nine-year-olds chose between partners who accepted or rejected resource allocations that were either strongly advantageously unequal, strongly disadvantageously unequal, or equal. They then played a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with their chosen partner. Children overwhelmingly preferred to play with the partner who accepted rather than rejected allocations. Regardless of their partner choice decisions, children tended to defect in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, yet expected that their partners would be relatively more cooperative. Finally, children were more likely to cooperate with those they believed would cooperate. Together, these findings shed new light on the links between partner choice, fairness and cooperation in child development.Laurent PrétôtGorana GonzalezKatherine McAuliffeNature PortfolioarticleMedicineRScienceQENScientific Reports, Vol 10, Iss 1, Pp 1-14 (2020)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Medicine R Science Q
spellingShingle	Medicine R Science Q Laurent Prétôt Gorana Gonzalez Katherine McAuliffe Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game
description	Abstract Human adults use a range of social cues to obtain information about potential partners in cooperative contexts: we prefer partners who are competent, wealthy and generous, and those who abide by moral and social rules. One factor that carries particular weight is whether a prospective partner is fair. Here we ask whether children share this preference for fair partners and, if so, whether a prospective partner’s past fair behaviour influences children’s behaviour in a cooperative dilemma. Six- to nine-year-olds chose between partners who accepted or rejected resource allocations that were either strongly advantageously unequal, strongly disadvantageously unequal, or equal. They then played a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with their chosen partner. Children overwhelmingly preferred to play with the partner who accepted rather than rejected allocations. Regardless of their partner choice decisions, children tended to defect in the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game, yet expected that their partners would be relatively more cooperative. Finally, children were more likely to cooperate with those they believed would cooperate. Together, these findings shed new light on the links between partner choice, fairness and cooperation in child development.
format	article
author	Laurent Prétôt Gorana Gonzalez Katherine McAuliffe
author_facet	Laurent Prétôt Gorana Gonzalez Katherine McAuliffe
author_sort	Laurent Prétôt
title	Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game
title_short	Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game
title_full	Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game
title_fullStr	Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game
title_full_unstemmed	Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game
title_sort	children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game
publisher	Nature Portfolio
publishDate	2020
url	https://doaj.org/article/54963fb8808c40b69dfa9eb1071708a7
work_keys_str_mv	AT laurentpretot childrenavoidinefficientbutfairpartnersinacooperativegame AT goranagonzalez childrenavoidinefficientbutfairpartnersinacooperativegame AT katherinemcauliffe childrenavoidinefficientbutfairpartnersinacooperativegame
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Children avoid inefficient but fair partners in a cooperative game

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