False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network

Smart grids are one of the most important structures based on cyber–physical devices. Therefore, these grids should be more reliable and efficient when increasing consumption. In recent years, however, with the automation of power grids and data transferring in a telecommunications infrastructure, t...

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Autores principales:	Xiang Zhong, Guang xin Li, Chuyan Zhng
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Elsevier 2021
Materias:	Power grid False data injection Undetectable attack Cyber-physical security Measurement vector 14 IEEE bus network Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering TK1-9971
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/550fe14fb6d24a0abd388e2545cc5f56
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:550fe14fb6d24a0abd388e2545cc5f56
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:550fe14fb6d24a0abd388e2545cc5f562021-11-28T04:33:58ZFalse data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network2352-484710.1016/j.egyr.2021.08.029https://doaj.org/article/550fe14fb6d24a0abd388e2545cc5f562021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352484721006314https://doaj.org/toc/2352-4847Smart grids are one of the most important structures based on cyber–physical devices. Therefore, these grids should be more reliable and efficient when increasing consumption. In recent years, however, with the automation of power grids and data transferring in a telecommunications infrastructure, the possibility of planning cyber-attacks has become a significant threat to systems integrity. Well-planned cyber-attacks can have catastrophic effects on the system to the extent that they may lead to a global blackout. It has been proven that, the optimization of the budgets for attack and defense in a power grid through cyber-attack is so essential. The aim of the present paper is investigate and simulate the most vulnerable operating bus using the state estimation technique through a new algorithm. The false data injection is performed on the data sent from the Phasor Measurement Units in such a way that it is not detectable to the grid dispatching operator under the invasion. In other words, when a cyber-attack occurs, the defender does not notice the attack and thus the estimated modes are destroyed. The proposed algorithm is implemented on a 14 IEEE bus network, and the best bus in terms of exposure under attack is identified. The proposed algorithm is based on the results obtained from state estimating of the grid after occur a cyber-attack on different buses. It was found that, the best bus to carry the attack was bus number 5, which causes the most changes in state variables with the least measurement damage. In addition, the most damage to the grid occurs when a cyber-attack causes the most damage in estimating the state of the most grid state variables.Xiang ZhongGuang xin LiChuyan ZhngElsevierarticlePower gridFalse data injectionUndetectable attackCyber-physical securityMeasurement vector14 IEEE bus networkElectrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineeringTK1-9971ENEnergy Reports, Vol 7, Iss , Pp 8476-8484 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Power grid False data injection Undetectable attack Cyber-physical security Measurement vector 14 IEEE bus network Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering TK1-9971
spellingShingle	Power grid False data injection Undetectable attack Cyber-physical security Measurement vector 14 IEEE bus network Electrical engineering. Electronics. Nuclear engineering TK1-9971 Xiang Zhong Guang xin Li Chuyan Zhng False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network
description	Smart grids are one of the most important structures based on cyber–physical devices. Therefore, these grids should be more reliable and efficient when increasing consumption. In recent years, however, with the automation of power grids and data transferring in a telecommunications infrastructure, the possibility of planning cyber-attacks has become a significant threat to systems integrity. Well-planned cyber-attacks can have catastrophic effects on the system to the extent that they may lead to a global blackout. It has been proven that, the optimization of the budgets for attack and defense in a power grid through cyber-attack is so essential. The aim of the present paper is investigate and simulate the most vulnerable operating bus using the state estimation technique through a new algorithm. The false data injection is performed on the data sent from the Phasor Measurement Units in such a way that it is not detectable to the grid dispatching operator under the invasion. In other words, when a cyber-attack occurs, the defender does not notice the attack and thus the estimated modes are destroyed. The proposed algorithm is implemented on a 14 IEEE bus network, and the best bus in terms of exposure under attack is identified. The proposed algorithm is based on the results obtained from state estimating of the grid after occur a cyber-attack on different buses. It was found that, the best bus to carry the attack was bus number 5, which causes the most changes in state variables with the least measurement damage. In addition, the most damage to the grid occurs when a cyber-attack causes the most damage in estimating the state of the most grid state variables.
format	article
author	Xiang Zhong Guang xin Li Chuyan Zhng
author_facet	Xiang Zhong Guang xin Li Chuyan Zhng
author_sort	Xiang Zhong
title	False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network
title_short	False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network
title_full	False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network
title_fullStr	False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network
title_full_unstemmed	False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network
title_sort	false data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 ieee bus network
publisher	Elsevier
publishDate	2021
url	https://doaj.org/article/550fe14fb6d24a0abd388e2545cc5f56
work_keys_str_mv	AT xiangzhong falsedatainjectioninpowersmartgridandidentificationofthemostvulnerablebusacasestudy14ieeebusnetwork AT guangxinli falsedatainjectioninpowersmartgridandidentificationofthemostvulnerablebusacasestudy14ieeebusnetwork AT chuyanzhng falsedatainjectioninpowersmartgridandidentificationofthemostvulnerablebusacasestudy14ieeebusnetwork
_version_	1718408317627269120

False data injection in power smart grid and identification of the most vulnerable bus; a case study 14 IEEE bus network

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