Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain

The importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research, although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechani...

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Autores principales:	Zhilin Wang, Qin Hu, Yawei Wang, Yinhao Xiao
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN
Publicado:	Elsevier 2022
Materias:	Blockchain Transaction pricing Game theory Correlated equilibrium Peer prediction Electronic computers. Computer science QA75.5-76.95
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/581bf5c311344e25aea57faed9a938ff
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:581bf5c311344e25aea57faed9a938ff2021-11-22T04:33:31ZTransaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain2667-295210.1016/j.hcc.2021.100044https://doaj.org/article/581bf5c311344e25aea57faed9a938ff2022-03-01T00:00:00Zhttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2667295221000349https://doaj.org/toc/2667-2952The importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research, although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. We also propose a truthful assessment model for pricing mechanism to collect the feedback of users regarding the price suggestion. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.Zhilin WangQin HuYawei WangYinhao XiaoElsevierarticleBlockchainTransaction pricingGame theoryCorrelated equilibriumPeer predictionElectronic computers. Computer scienceQA75.5-76.95ENHigh-Confidence Computing, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 100044- (2022)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN
topic	Blockchain Transaction pricing Game theory Correlated equilibrium Peer prediction Electronic computers. Computer science QA75.5-76.95
spellingShingle	Blockchain Transaction pricing Game theory Correlated equilibrium Peer prediction Electronic computers. Computer science QA75.5-76.95 Zhilin Wang Qin Hu Yawei Wang Yinhao Xiao Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
description	The importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research, although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. We also propose a truthful assessment model for pricing mechanism to collect the feedback of users regarding the price suggestion. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.
format	article
author	Zhilin Wang Qin Hu Yawei Wang Yinhao Xiao
author_facet	Zhilin Wang Qin Hu Yawei Wang Yinhao Xiao
author_sort	Zhilin Wang
title	Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
title_short	Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
title_full	Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
title_fullStr	Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
title_full_unstemmed	Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
title_sort	transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain
publisher	Elsevier
publishDate	2022
url	https://doaj.org/article/581bf5c311344e25aea57faed9a938ff
work_keys_str_mv	AT zhilinwang transactionpricingmechanismdesignandassessmentforblockchain AT qinhu transactionpricingmechanismdesignandassessmentforblockchain AT yaweiwang transactionpricingmechanismdesignandassessmentforblockchain AT yinhaoxiao transactionpricingmechanismdesignandassessmentforblockchain
_version_	1718418161431216128

Transaction pricing mechanism design and assessment for blockchain

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