Actions and attitudes

Any phenomenologically sensitive account of action must be able to deal with at least two features which characterise many examples of acting. First, actions can be rational; that is, an agent can act for or in light of reasons. However, the phenomenology of action stresses that action is primarily...

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Autor principal:	Donnchadh O’Conaill
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	EN FR IT
Publicado:	Rosenberg & Sellier 2016
Materias:	action phenomenology reasons engaged coping McDowell Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
Acceso en línea:	https://doaj.org/article/5824588d3dc545c483c79fcf4eaf1b7d
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id	oai:doaj.org-article:5824588d3dc545c483c79fcf4eaf1b7d
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:5824588d3dc545c483c79fcf4eaf1b7d2021-12-02T10:11:07ZActions and attitudes10.13128/Phe_Mi-196472280-78532239-4028https://doaj.org/article/5824588d3dc545c483c79fcf4eaf1b7d2016-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://oaj.fupress.net/index.php/pam/article/view/7055https://doaj.org/toc/2280-7853https://doaj.org/toc/2239-4028 Any phenomenologically sensitive account of action must be able to deal with at least two features which characterise many examples of acting. First, actions can be rational; that is, an agent can act for or in light of reasons. However, the phenomenology of action stresses that action is primarily a practical mode of engagement with the world, and so need not be guided by reasoning or abstract principles. I shall offer a phenomenologically-informed account of how action might be able to meet both of these descriptions. To do this, I shall develop Husserl’s notion of an attitude. On my interpretation, an attitude is the intentional structure of the agent’s ability to perform a particular kind of action. Since an attitude is an intentional framework, it is not something which must be attended to before the action can be performed. Agents can justify their actions by appealing to what they were aiming to do and to the demands and opportunities of their situation. An attitude is precisely the agent’s awareness of their situation as allowing for courses of action structured by goals and possible means. The agent can justify their action by appealing, not the attitude itself, but to the way their situation appeared in that attitude. Donnchadh O’ConaillRosenberg & Sellierarticleactionphenomenologyreasonsengaged copingMcDowellAestheticsBH1-301EthicsBJ1-1725ENFRITPhenomenology and Mind, Iss 1 (2016)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	EN FR IT
topic	action phenomenology reasons engaged coping McDowell Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725
spellingShingle	action phenomenology reasons engaged coping McDowell Aesthetics BH1-301 Ethics BJ1-1725 Donnchadh O’Conaill Actions and attitudes
description	Any phenomenologically sensitive account of action must be able to deal with at least two features which characterise many examples of acting. First, actions can be rational; that is, an agent can act for or in light of reasons. However, the phenomenology of action stresses that action is primarily a practical mode of engagement with the world, and so need not be guided by reasoning or abstract principles. I shall offer a phenomenologically-informed account of how action might be able to meet both of these descriptions. To do this, I shall develop Husserl’s notion of an attitude. On my interpretation, an attitude is the intentional structure of the agent’s ability to perform a particular kind of action. Since an attitude is an intentional framework, it is not something which must be attended to before the action can be performed. Agents can justify their actions by appealing to what they were aiming to do and to the demands and opportunities of their situation. An attitude is precisely the agent’s awareness of their situation as allowing for courses of action structured by goals and possible means. The agent can justify their action by appealing, not the attitude itself, but to the way their situation appeared in that attitude.
format	article
author	Donnchadh O’Conaill
author_facet	Donnchadh O’Conaill
author_sort	Donnchadh O’Conaill
title	Actions and attitudes
title_short	Actions and attitudes
title_full	Actions and attitudes
title_fullStr	Actions and attitudes
title_full_unstemmed	Actions and attitudes
title_sort	actions and attitudes
publisher	Rosenberg & Sellier
publishDate	2016
url	https://doaj.org/article/5824588d3dc545c483c79fcf4eaf1b7d
work_keys_str_mv	AT donnchadhoconaill actionsandattitudes
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Actions and attitudes

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