Actions and attitudes
Any phenomenologically sensitive account of action must be able to deal with at least two features which characterise many examples of acting. First, actions can be rational; that is, an agent can act for or in light of reasons. However, the phenomenology of action stresses that action is primarily...
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Autor principal: | Donnchadh O’Conaill |
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Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2016
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Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/5824588d3dc545c483c79fcf4eaf1b7d |
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