Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action

During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environme...

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Autor principal:	José Ángel Gascón
Formato:	article
Lenguaje:	CS EN SK
Publicado:	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences 2021
Materias:	cognitive psychology explanation justification motivation rationalization reasons for action Philosophy (General) B1-5802
Acceso en línea:	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28405 https://doaj.org/article/59115f406b5f4f50a8042d193acafe2d
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spelling	oai:doaj.org-article:59115f406b5f4f50a8042d193acafe2d2021-12-02T17:45:27ZWhy Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Actionhttps://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.284051335-06682585-7150https://doaj.org/article/59115f406b5f4f50a8042d193acafe2d2021-11-01T00:00:00Zhttps://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/11292246orgf.2021.28405.pdfhttps://doaj.org/toc/1335-0668https://doaj.org/toc/2585-7150During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environment of which we are not aware, and the reasons we offer for those decisions are a posteriori rationalisations. But exactly what reasons has the psychological research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been commonly made between normative and motivating reasons: normative reasons make an action right, whereas motivating reasons explain our behaviour. Recently, Maria Alvarez has argued that, apart from normative (or justifying) reasons, we should further distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. We have, then, three kinds of reasons, and it is not clear which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions by the psychological research. The answer we give to this question will have important implications both for the validity of our classifications of reasons and for our understanding of human action.José Ángel GascónInstitute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciencesarticlecognitive psychologyexplanationjustificationmotivationrationalizationreasons for actionPhilosophy (General)B1-5802CSENSKOrganon F, Vol 28, Iss 4, Pp 845-866 (2021)
institution	DOAJ
collection	DOAJ
language	CS EN SK
topic	cognitive psychology explanation justification motivation rationalization reasons for action Philosophy (General) B1-5802
spellingShingle	cognitive psychology explanation justification motivation rationalization reasons for action Philosophy (General) B1-5802 José Ángel Gascón Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action
description	During the last decades several studies in cognitive psychology have shown that many of our actions do not depend on the reasons that we adduce afterwards, when we have to account for them. Our decisions seem to be often influenced by normatively or explanatorily irrelevant features of the environment of which we are not aware, and the reasons we offer for those decisions are a posteriori rationalisations. But exactly what reasons has the psychological research uncovered? In philosophy, a distinction has been commonly made between normative and motivating reasons: normative reasons make an action right, whereas motivating reasons explain our behaviour. Recently, Maria Alvarez has argued that, apart from normative (or justifying) reasons, we should further distinguish between motivating and explanatory reasons. We have, then, three kinds of reasons, and it is not clear which of them have been revealed as the real reasons for our actions by the psychological research. The answer we give to this question will have important implications both for the validity of our classifications of reasons and for our understanding of human action.
format	article
author	José Ángel Gascón
author_facet	José Ángel Gascón
author_sort	José Ángel Gascón
title	Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action
title_short	Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action
title_full	Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action
title_fullStr	Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action
title_full_unstemmed	Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action
title_sort	why did you really do it? human reasoning and reasons for action
publisher	Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
publishDate	2021
url	https://doi.org/10.31577/orgf.2021.28405 https://doaj.org/article/59115f406b5f4f50a8042d193acafe2d
work_keys_str_mv	AT joseangelgascon whydidyoureallydoithumanreasoningandreasonsforaction
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Why Did You Really Do It? Human Reasoning and Reasons for Action

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