Consciousness and Cognition. The Cognitive Phenomenology Debate
According to a position which has dominated the theoretical landscape in the philosophy of mind until recently, only sensory states exhibit a characteristic phenomenal dimension, whereas cognitive states either utterly lack it, or inherit it from some of their accompanying sensory states. This posi...
Guardado en:
Autores principales: | Elisabetta Sacchi, Alberto Voltolini |
---|---|
Formato: | article |
Lenguaje: | EN FR IT |
Publicado: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2017
|
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://doaj.org/article/5ab29c63ffd24a50bfd254410cfe21d5 |
Etiquetas: |
Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!
|
Ejemplares similares
-
On the Relationship between Cognitive and Sensory Phenomenology
por: Elisabetta Sacchi
Publicado: (2017) -
On Experiencing Meaning: Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and Sinewave Speech
por: John Joseph Dorsch
Publicado: (2017) -
Varieties of Cognitive Phenomenology
por: Alberto Voltolini
Publicado: (2017) -
Irreducible Cognitive Phenomenology and the Aha! Experience
por: John Joseph Dorsch
Publicado: (2017) -
The Dynamic Phenomenology of Occurrent Thinking
por: Fergus Anderson
Publicado: (2017)